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ABSTRACT
Cognitive ability is perhaps the most studied individual difference available to 
researchers, being measured quickly and effectively while demonstrating a predictable 
influence on many life outcomes. Historically, the evolution of the psychometric study of 
cognitive abilities has pivoted on the development of new and better methodologies 
allowing for a more complete and efficient capture o f intellect. For instance, recent 
advances in computer and Internet technology have largely replaced traditional 
pencil-and-paper methods, allowing for innovative item development and presentation. 
However, concerns regarding the potential adverse impact and test security of online 
measures of cognitive ability, particularly in unproctored situations, are well documented 
and have limited the use of such measures in organizational settings. Methods, such as 
the use of multiple test forms and computer adaptive testing coupled with item exposure 
algorithms, have addressed some test-security concerns. However, these methods require 
the costly and tedious development o f extensive item pools. The burgeoning area of 
automatic item generation potentially addresses many of the test-security and 
item-development concerns through the creation of assessment items based solely on an 
item model and a computer algorithm. Moreover, once the elements that contribute to 
item difficulty are calibrated, the psychometric properties o f the items are known, 
meaning that little to no human review of the items is required before their use. The 
purpose o f the current study was to develop an experimental non-verbal measure of
cognitive ability through automatic item generation, using an innovative item type. Using 
a sample o f 333 adults, the results o f the current analysis support the proposed cognitive 
model’s ability to explain item difficulty. Likewise, the temporal stability and predictive 
validity o f the experimental measure are supported. In doing so, the experimental 
measure answers some o f the test-security and item-generation concerns that are 
associated with the development and administration of cognitive-ability measures in 
organizational settings.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The measurement of cognitive ability has been heralded as one o f the crowning 
achievements of the psychological sciences (Lamb, 1994). For an investment o f an hour 
or less, psychologists can gain insights into an individual’s functioning that may not be 
uncovered through long and costly observations (Nettlebeck & Wilson, 2005). It is the 
easiest, most reliable, and most valid individual difference available to psychologists and 
researchers, measured cheaply and quickly (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2009; Fumham, 2008; 
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Moreover, the scores obtained from broad measures of 
cognitive ability (e.g., I.Q.) conform to the terms commonly used in society to describe 
individuals as intelligent or smart (Hermstein & Murray, 1994). As such, the terms 
cognitive ability and general mental ability (GMA) are often used synonymously with 
intelligence (Gottfredson, 2002).
However, change is a defining feature o f the cognitive-abilities research. 
Throughout the history o f psychometric investigations of cognitive abilities, researchers 
have embraced methodological advances leading to better and more efficient methods of 
understanding the nature o f intellect. For instance, the development o f sophisticated 
statistical procedures such as exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis allowed
2cognitive theorists to peer beyond the data and develop models that explain the nature of 
intellectual ability (Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1971; Guilford, 1988; McGrew, 1997; 
Spearman, 1904; Thurstone, 1938). These advanced statistical procedures have also aided 
in the nullification or outright dismissal of competing theories of intelligence that fail to 
produce consistent or logical evidence concerning their validity (Carroll, 2003; Keith & 
Reynolds, 2010). Thus, methodological advances have aided cognitive abilities 
researchers in the pursuit o f greater clarity with regard to what it means to be clever.
Change is also a constant in the measurement o f cognitive abilities. For instance, 
early investigations of intellectual functioning focused primarily on measures o f sensory 
ability as proxy measures of intellectual ability (Hergenhahn, 2009). However, once it 
was demonstrated that sensory abilities failed to explain real-world performance (e.g., 
academic achievement), attention was turned to the measurement of higher level mental 
processes and their practical benefits in differentiating the performance of individuals. 
Likewise, the circumstances o f World War I dictated a paradigm shift in assessment 
administration. The result of this shift was the advent of group testing, allowing for the 
quick and efficient collection of vast amounts o f information on a large number of 
individuals for whom personnel decisions could be made (Boake, 2002). As such, 
cognitive-abilities research and measurement can be seen as an evolving field marked by 
innovation resulting in more accurate and efficient measures of intellectual ability 
(Drasgow & Olson-Buchanan, 1999; Gierl & Haladyna, 2012; Parshall & Harmes, 2009).
Throughout much of the 20th century, paper-and-pencil-based measures of 
cognitive abilities were the dominant medium by which intelligence was tested. As it has 
in almost all other areas of society, the technological revolution has transformed our daily
3lives. Computers are now small, fast, and cheap, allowing much of society to embrace 
their use (Chernyshenko & Stark, 2015). However, advances in computer and Internet 
technology have opened a new universe of methodological considerations from which 
cognitive ability can be tapped (Naglieri et al., 2004). While early versions of 
computer-based assessments were little more than direct translations of paper-and-pencil 
measures to a computerized medium, the measurement o f cognitive ability is no longer 
restricted to static statements and images (Barak & English, 2002; Bartram, 2006).
Rather, a diverse array o f innovative and dynamic auditory and visual items can be 
administered via computer, potentially tapping cognitive ability in ways that were 
previously impossible to achieve (Parshall & Harmes, 2009). Moreover, computerized 
assessments realize practical benefits such as standardized item administration and 
automatic scoring, thus reducing error and improving test reliability. Likewise, 
administering computerized assessments online allows for an immense pool of test takers 
to sit for the same measure from anywhere in the world and at a time of their choosing, 
reducing the costs associated with testing programs (Drasgow & Olson-Buchanan, 1999; 
Naglieri et al., 2004). Thus, many test developers have embraced the technological 
revolution as more and more tests are being developed that can exploit the advantages 
afforded by computers and the Internet.
Despite the practical and measurement advantages offered by computer and 
online administration, problems in the areas o f test construction and administration 
persist. For instance, large item pools are generally required as part o f the 
test-development process. This problem is compounded when multiple forms of the same 
measure or advanced item-presentation methods (e.g., computer-adaptive testing) are
4used, necessitating an even larger number of items (Drasgow, Nye, Guo, & Tay, 2009). 
However, not all items that are created are useable. Despite the need for quality items and 
despite care taken to generate items that tap the construct of interest, many items must be 
removed at the item-analysis phase due to insufficient psychometric characteristics 
(Geerlings, Glas, & van der Linden, 2011; Wainer, 2002). This problem is particularly 
relevant to human item writers who often fail to construct items that conform to the 
construct of interest or at a desirable level of difficulty, further limiting the number of 
usable items (Homke & Habon, 1986). Moreover, some cognitive researchers have 
questioned the validity o f the results obtained from measures of intelligence administered 
in unproctored environments (Naglieri et al., 2004). The administration of measures in 
uncontrolled environments introduces a host of test-security threats (e.g., cheating) that 
distort test taker scores in ways that are difficult to detect. Since these distortions are not 
systematic, the validity o f a measure is often greatly reduced due to the lessened 
predictive power it possesses (Foster, 2010). Thus, although technological advances have 
afforded greater options in how and where tests are administered, persistent issues remain 
that stunt researchers’ ability to obtain convenient and accurate results.
The burgeoning arena o f automatic item generation (AIG) seeks to address the 
concerns raised through the generation of a vast number o f unique items strictly through 
an algorithm (Gierl, Ball, Vele, & Lai, 2015). Using an item model, the structural 
elements that relate to item difficulty are identified and manipulated, producing an array 
of items with known psychometric characteristics. Thus, little or no human review of the 
items is required before their administration (Doebler & Holling, 2015). Moreover, recent 
advances in AIG methodology allow for the creation of items directly from the calibrated
5structural elements, thereby addressing several issues associated with traditional test 
construction and administration (Geerlings, van der Linden, & Glas, 2012).
Despite the advantages posed through its use, limited research exists concerning 
the construction and subsequent validation o f cognitive ability measures developed using 
AIG methodology (Gierl & Lai, 2012). Many researchers studying AIG measures have 
only examined the construct validation of the items, ignoring the predictive validity of 
these measures. Furthermore, the capability to create dynamically generated and 
presented items on-the-fly though AIG methodology has received little attention 
(Geerlings et al., 2012).
The purpose o f the current research is to build on the existing AIG 
methodological framework through the construction and validation of an on-the-fly 
measure o f cognitive ability that is generated at the time o f item presentation. As such, 
this measure will not draw from a preexisting pool o f items. Rather, the current measure 
will create items dynamically through predefined computer algorithms. The benefits of 
such a measure will address many o f the issues that surround current test development. 
First, such a measure will be capable of generating a vast number o f items through the 
use of an algorithm applied to an item model, producing items with known psychometric 
characteristics. As such, once calibrated, thousands o f unique items o f varying difficulty 
can be generated, without the need o f human intervention. Second, many issues o f test 
security will be addressed as each test taker will be administered different items. 
Although different items will comprise the measure for each test taker, the items will be 
calibrated such that the measure has identical construct adherence and psychometric 
properties. Third, once created, the criterion related validity o f the measure will be
6assessed by examining the relationship that the experimental AIG measure shares with 
established indicators of cognitive ability. Thus, the experimental AIG measure created 
through this research is expected to advance the field’s understanding of AIG item 
development and its relationship to other measures of cognitive ability.
Cognitive Ability
Although cognitive ability is one of the most studied individual differences in all 
of psychology (Gottfredson, 2002), reaching definitional agreement has proven 
problematic. In general terms, cognitive ability can be conceptualized as the basic mental 
capacity to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, understand sophisticated and 
complex ideas, and acquire new information quickly and efficiently (Gottfredson, 2004). 
Similarly, Neisser (1967) defines intelligence as the “ability to understand complex ideas, 
to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience and to engage in various 
forms o f reasoning to overcome obstacles by taking thought” (p.7). Despite these 
seemingly straightforward descriptions o f intelligence, substantial disagreement remains 
among cognitive ability theorists regarding the number of facets that are considered 
essential and how they should be arranged (Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1971; Guilford, 1988; 
McGrew, 1997; Spearman, 1904; Sternberg, 1999). As quipped by Ackerman, Beier, and 
Boyle (2005), “there are as many intelligence theories as there are intelligence 
theorists...” (p. 31).
From a practical standpoint, people are readily able to recognize intelligence in 
others. Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, and Bernstein (1981) attempted to uncover this 
implicit conceptualization of intelligence by asking laypersons going about their daily 
lives in places such as grocery store parking lots to describe the behaviors associated with
various portrayals o f intelligence. The researchers then asked cognitive ability experts 
(i.e., psychologists) the same question. After analyzing the statements produced, the 
researchers found that although the two groups differed in their academic familiarity with 
the construct, both groups produced a pattern of relatively consistent descriptive terms of 
intellectual ability. For example, the attributes most associated with prototypical 
intellectual ability included problem solving, reasoning, and open-mindedness. 
Conversely, the hallmarks of unintelligence are characterized by personality trait-like 
behaviors (Costa & McCrae, 1992) including a lack of curiosity and a lack o f tolerance 
of the views held by others. However, despite the consistency of responses obtained by 
the researchers, the variety of the descriptors of prototypical intellectual ability is 
indicative of the difficulty cognitive theorists have had in reaching definitional 
agreement.
Factor Analytic Theories
Although obtaining definitive agreement on a definition o f intelligence has been 
elusive (Sternberg & Detterman, 1986), the emergence of several theories o f intelligence 
can be traced to an important development in the field o f statistics. In the early 1900s, 
Charles Spearman (1904) developed a primitive form of modem factor analysis allowing 
researchers to clarify the latent relationships shared by specific variables or phenomena. 
The purpose of factor analysis is to reduce and represent the number o f observed 
variables into a smaller number of underlying hypothetical variables or "factors" 
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). The interpretation and measurement of each factor is 
dependent on a determination of the observed variables that make up the factor. Thus, by 
examining the interrelationships shown from factor analyzing measures o f intellect,
theorists are able to construct models of cognitive abilities that account for the results 
obtained.
Importantly, the latent structure of the factors that emerges from factor analysis is 
often open to interpretation. The choices made in conducting factor analysis (e.g., 
rotations, eigenvalue and factor loading cutoffs) complicate the convergence of 
interpretations that are made (DeVellis, 2012). Moreover, the labels that are applied to 
the factor(s) that emerge are dependent on the researcher’s ability to subjectively 
determine the content and associated psychological processes of the measures that load 
most heavily on a particular factor. Thus, the interpretation of factors can be viewed as an 
art grounded in empirical data.
As stated by Humphreys (1962), “test behavior can almost endlessly be made 
more specific...factors can almost endlessly be fractionated or splintered” (p. 475). Thus, 
competing theories o f intelligence have emerged stipulating a variety o f structures and a 
diverse set o f factors that make up cognitive functioning. However, as pointed out by 
Vernon (1950), only the factors that are “shown to have significant practical value in 
daily life are worth incorporating in the picture” (p. 25).
Two-Factor Theory. Perhaps the most famous and influential of the cognitive 
theorists is Charles Spearman. Noting that students who performed well on one measure 
o f intelligence tended to perform well on other cognitive measures, Spearman (1904) 
used his factor analytic technique to identify the commonalities across performance 
across measures. Based on his findings, Spearman developed his theory o f general 
intelligence, tapped by all measures of cognitive ability. Known as the Two-Factor theory 
o f Intelligence, Spearman found that two factors or forms of intelligence emerged from
9the data: a general factor (g) and a test specific (5) factor. According to Spearman (1927), 
g  is an innate general mental ability that contributes to all cognitive processes. This g  
factor is a "general fund o f mental energy” (Spearman, 1914, p. 103) that explains why 
an individual’s score on any given measure o f cognitive ability is correlated with the 
scores obtained from other measures of cognitive ability. Conversely, .v-factors explain 
why someone may obtain higher or lower scores on any given intellectual measure, but 
not performance across measures or task-domains. That is, specific factors, along with 
error, explain why performance on different cognitive measures is less than perfectly 
correlated. As such, 5-factors do not add to the prediction of additional variance in 
cognitive ability because they operate only within specific measures of intelligence 
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). Thus, g  and 5 are differentiated in that g  is responsible for an 
individual’s performance across all measures of cognitive ability, while 5-factors are 
restricted to performance on independent measures of mental abilities. As such, g  is 
thought to explain intellectual test performance (Jensen, 1998), conforming to what 
people describe as intelligence and leading most psychologists to adopt it as their 
operational definition o f intelligence (Gottfredson, 2002). Thus, the importance of g  to 
intellectual ability cannot be overstated as indicated by Ree and Earles (1993), “g is to 
psychology what carbon is to chemistry” (p.l 1).
Evidence of Spearman’s theory is provided by the positive correlation observed 
across measures o f cognitive ability. The g  factor emerges regardless o f whether mental 
test batteries are administered to different ages, sexes, races, and national groups and 
subsequently factor analyzed (Jensen, 1998). As such, although mental tests are designed 
to measure specific areas o f cognitive functioning (e.g., verbal, spatial, and quantitative
ability), individuals who perform well in one area, also tend to perform well on the others 
(Gardner, 1999), a phenomenon that Spearman termed "indifference o f the indicator" 
(Spearman, 1927).
The core o f cognitive ability research rests on this positive manifold (van der 
Maas, Kan, & Borsboom, 2014), the observation that the subtests o f all intelligence tests 
ranging from academic measures to measures of social intelligence are positively 
correlated, g refers to a latent variable that results from the intercorrelation o f several 
measures o f cognitive ability (Spearman, 1927). Tests that correlated well with other 
measures of intelligence are indicative o f higher levels of g-saturation. As such, 
g-saturation indicates the degree that a measure is tapping the general fund of mental 
energy. In contrast, cognitive tests that demonstrate a lesser relationship to other 
measures are thought to tap s factors such as residual variance due to test-specific 
abilities or otherwise contain error (e.g., unreliability). Therefore, higher levels of 
g-saturation are considered better predictors o f intelligence. As such, Spearman suggests 
that a single highly g-saturated test be substituted for heterogeneous collections o f tasks 
and items found in measures o f intelligence (Spearman, 1927).
In order to select a measure that best approximated g, Spearman (1927) described 
g as the ability to extrapolate principles from one’s experience and observations, best 
measured by abstract reasoning problems in formal tests. According to Spearman (1938), 
the Penrose and Raven (1936), later named Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven & 
Court, 1989) well represented the abilities associated with g. As such, the defining 
characteristics o f tests that tap g  are non-verbal assessments of spatial or inductive 
reasoning.
11
Spearman noted that the Two-factor theory must be qualified, allowing for an 
intermediate class of factors that fall between g  and .s-factor. These intermediate factors, 
termed group factors, relate to some but not all intellectual tasks. Group factors are 
neither as universally broad as g, nor as specific as .v (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). Through 
the continued research of Spearman and his students, group factors such as mathematical, 
mechanical, and linguistic abilities were uncovered, laying the groundwork for future 
research and the development o f more complex models o f intellectual ability.
Primary Mental Abilities. On the heels of Spearman’s work in identifying group 
factors, theories of intelligence moved from the existence of a single underlying mental 
ability to the identification o f several abilities, and then to many. One such theory of 
multiple-intelligence was promoted by Louis Thurstone. Thurstone (1947) developed an 
advanced factor analytic technique allowing for the discovery o f a multiple-factor 
structure of intelligence using orthogonal and oblique rotations, improving the 
interpretability o f the data. Employing these techniques, Thurstone identified g  as a 
second order factor subsuming narrower mental abilities.
Thurston (1938) concluded that intelligence could best be explained by seven 
primary mental abilities: Word Fluency, Verbal Comprehension, Number, Space, 
Perceptual Speed, Associative Memory, and Induction. Thus, in contrast to Spearman, 
Thurstone believed that cognitive ability was the result o f multiple factors o f cognitive 
abilities rather than a single overarching factor.
Despite Thurstone’s assertion that intelligence was comprised of seven 
independent abilities, subsequent studies failed to replicate his findings. Rather, later 
studies showed that the original factors that Thurston obtained were less orthogonal than
12
originally believed (Thurstone & Thurstone, 1941). Thus, after noting the 
intercorrelations obtained between mental ability measures specifically designed to assess 
discrete facets of cognitive ability, Thurston (1947) doubted the possibility that an 
orthogonal structure of intelligence could be developed that did not capture g, reconciling 
his ideas with those o f Spearman.
Structure-of-Intellect. Despite Thurstone’s assertion, other theorists have denied 
the existence of g. For instance, based on his own factor analytic research, Guilford 
(1967, 1988) developed a model that eliminated the role o f g  in explaining performance 
on intelligence measures. Guilford's Structure-of-Intellect (S-I) is a box-like schema from 
which intellectual traits are classified along three dimensions: Operations, Contents, and 
Products. Operations represent the mental activities or processes that are performed by 
the individual. Operations can be further classified as cognition, memory recording, 
memory retention, divergent production, convergent production, and evaluation. Contents 
represent the information or materials that receive the operations. Contents include 
auditory, visual, semantic, symbolic, and behavioral information. Products represent the 
various forms in which content may be processed. Products can be further classified as 
units, classes, relations, systems, transformations, and implications.
Each factor of cognitive ability in Guilford’s S-I model is derived from the 
sub-classifications of the Operations, Contents, and Products dimensions. Since at least 
one factor is expected from each cell in the schema, 180 (6 x 5 x 6 = 180) or more factors 
constitute intellectual ability. As such, abilities represent a specific operation, in a 
specific content area, leading to a specific output (e.g., Evaluation o f Semantic 
Implications). Since Guilford considered the factors that were produced from the S-I
13
model to be orthogonal, he rejected the value of g  and hierarchical relationships of mental 
abilities. Like Thurstone’s model, the S-I model was derived from an orthogonal rotation 
of test scores (Guilford, 1967). However, unlike other factor analytic theories, the S-I 
theory o f intelligence was derived from a theoretical basis and tests were then constructed 
to measure the hypothesized components.
However, the S-l model failed to gain an influential foothold in cognitive ability 
testing (Carroll, 1993). Likewise, re-analyses o f Guilford’s factor-analytic data indicate 
that other models provide better fit to the data, including randomly generated models. As 
such, Carroll (1993) described the considerable amount of attention paid to the S-I model 
as disturbing and as providing the impression that the model is a widely accepted and 
valid theory o f cognitive ability, which it is not.
Gf-Gc. In contrast to the S-I theory, a model that is widely accepted is the Gf-Gc 
theory forwarded by Cattell (1941). Based on the works o f Thurstone in the 1930s, the 
original Gf-Gc theory suggests that intellectual ability is comprised o f two primary 
abilities: Fluid and Crystalized Intelligences.
Fluid Intelligence (Gf) consists of the focused attention to process information 
and solve problems that cannot be performed automatically and/or are independent of any 
learned information (Schneider & McGrew, 2012). Since the abilities that are associated 
with G f  are biologically rooted, they are thought to be culture-free, non-verbal, and 
independent of any form of instruction allowing individuals to adapt to new situations 
and learn from their environments (Cattell, 1957, 1971). Thus, individuals who possess 
high levels of G f  are able to act quickly and encode short-term memories that enable 
abstract problem solving. The mental operations associated with G f  that promote problem
14
solving include recognizing and transforming information and concepts, perceiving 
relationships among patterns, drawing inferences or otherwise extrapolating answers, and 
comprehending the implications of the solution reached. Inductive and deductive 
reasoning are the defining characteristics of fluid intelligence best measured through 
tasks including figural matrices, number series, analogical reasoning, and figural analyses 
(Sattler, 2001).
Crystalized Intelligence (Gc) consists o f the acquired skills and knowledge that 
are derived from one’s experience and valued by one’s culture (Schneider & McGrew, 
2012). As described by Horn and Blankson (2005), the abilities associated with Gc are 
verbally based, developed through an investment of mental energies into educational and 
other life experiences. The types o f knowledge that are subsumed by Gc include both 
static declarative (e.g., factual information, comprehension, concepts, rules, and 
relationships) and dynamic procedural (e.g., process of reasoning based on previously 
learned information). As such, Gc is not only a repository o f information, but is also a set 
of processing abilities wherein memory retrieval and the application of general 
knowledge are components.
Cattell-Horn. Through his own factor analytic research, Horn ( 1968, 1988, 1991) 
expanded on Cattell's dichotomous Gf-Gc model, adding several additional factors: visual 
perception or processing (Gv), speed o f processing (Gs), short-term memory (Gsm), 
long-term memory (Glr), auditory processing ability (Ga). Later, Horn added factors 
representing reaction time and decision speed (Gt), quantitative (Gq), and broad 
reading-writing (Grw) abilities. This conglomerate eight-factor model became known as 
the Cattell-Horn theory (Horn, 1991).
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Three-Stratum Theory. Carroll (1993) reported the exploratory factor analytic 
results o f over 460 datasets, building on the research of influential theorists such as 
Cattell, Horn, Thurstone, and Thorndike. The magnitude and comprehensiveness o f this 
analysis was not lost on other researchers. As indicated by Jensen (2004), "Carroll's 
magnum opus thus distills and synthesizes the results of a century of factor analyses of 
mental tests. It is virtually the grand finale o f the era o f psychometric description and 
taxonomy of human cognitive abilities. It is unlikely that his monumental feat will ever 
be attempted again by anyone, or that it could be much improved on" (p. 5).
Carroll's influential Three-Stratum theory of intelligence differentiates factors and 
abilities into three hierarchically arranged levels (Carroll, 1997). In geological terms, a 
stratum is a bed o f sedimentary rock or soil that distinguishes itself from adjacent strata. 
Similarly, Carroll proposed that intelligence is best modeled in hierarchical terms. The 
top stratum, Stratum III, is g  or general intellectual ability. As represented by Spearman 
(1904), g  is a broad processing ability that is behind all higher-order thinking and 
subsumes the other two strata in the models. Known as broad or Stratum II abilities, the 
second stratum is comprised of eight abilities, incorporating Cattell's fluid (Gf) and 
crystalized (Gc) intelligences, along with broad visual perception (Gv), broad auditory 
perception (Ga), broad retrieval capacity (Gr), broad cognitive speediness (G.s), 
processing/decision speed (Gt), and general memory and learning (Gy), each requiring 
differing processes, tasks, and content. These abilities are the most recognized and 
prominent abilities in Carroll’s model, representing "basic constitutional and long 
standing characteristics o f individuals that can govern or influence a wide variety of 
behaviors in a given domain" (Carroll, 1993; p. 634). Below each Stratum II ability lays
the 69 Stratum I level factors or speed factors that are associated with a specific Stratum 
II ability (Jensen, 1998). These narrow abilities "...represent greater specializations of 
abilities, often in quite specific ways that reflect the effects of experience and learning, or 
the adoption of particular strategies o f performance” (Carroll, 1993, p. 634). Although 
other theorist such as Burt (1949) and Vernon (1950) proposed hierarchical models of 
intellectual ability, Carroll’s model was the first “empirically based taxonomy of 
cognitive ability... presented in a single organized framework” (McGrew, 2009, p. 2).
Importantly, the abilities in Carroll’s model exhibit positive relationships with one 
another. As such, the mutual relationships shared between the narrow Stratum I abilities 
gives rise to the broader Stratum II abilities. Likewise, the positive relationships that 
associate Stratum II abilities allows for the approximation of the g-factor at Stratum III. 
Although these positive relationships indicate that the abilities are not completely 
orthogonal to one another, a vast amount o f research indicates that the factors can be 
consistently differentiated from one another, thus indicating that they are in fact unique 
facets of cognitive ability (Keith & Reynolds, 2010).
Cattell-Horn-Carroll. Carroll (1993) stated that the Cattell-Horn Gf-Gc model 
"appears to offer the most well-founded and reasonable approach to an acceptable theory 
o f the structure o f cognitive abilities” (p. 62). Perhaps due to his admiration of the work 
o f Cattell and Horn, the Carroll’s Three Stratum and the Cattell-Horn models are quite 
similar. For example, both of the proposed models contain broad abilities that subsume 
narrower abilities. Likewise, both models share similar classifications o f these abilities. 
However, the models are distinguished from one another. Several o f the differences 
between the models involve the definitions attributed to specific abilities and the
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groupings of narrower facets. The biggest difference between the models is existence of 
g. That is. Carroll’s model suggests that an overarching g-factor subsumes narrower 
abilities, while the Cattell-Horn model does not include a g-factor.
Despite the differences embodied by the Cattell-Horn and Carroll models, 
researchers recognized the need for a common framework to describe, organize, select, 
and interpret assessments and assessment batteries. To meet this need, McGrew (1997) 
proposed a hybrid model combining the Cattell-Horn and Carroll models in to what 
became known as the Cattell-Hom-Carroll (CHC) theory, with the order o f the names 
reflecting the chronological order in which the theorists made their contributions. As 
such, CHC theory represents over 60 years o f factor analytic research o f cognitive ability.
The CHC model is arranged in three hierarchal levels. Like Carroll’s 
Three-Stratum theory, at Stratum III, the top level, the general factor o f intelligence or g 
resides. Stratum II contains the broad cognitive abilities while the narrow abilities lie at 
the bottom level in Stratum I. In its original configuration, CHC theory contained 10 
broad cognitive abilities and over 70 narrow abilities. However, CHC theory is not static. 
Rather, CHC is continuously refined, reorganized, and restructured as additional research 
is conducted (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; Flanagan, 2000). As stated by Jensen (2004), 
CHC is "an open-ended empirical theory to which future tests o f as yet unmeasured or 
unknown abilities could possibly result in additional factors at one or more levels in 
Carroll's hierarchy” (p. 5). Carroll (2005) reiterates this point noting that CHC most 
assuredly contains errors that may be rectified through continued research. In its current 
form, CHC theory consists o f 16 broad stratum abilities and over 80 narrow abilities 
(Schneider & McGrew, 2012). The 16 broad stratum abilities o f CHC currently include
Fluid Intelligence (Gf), Crystalized Intelligence (Gc), General (Domain-Specific) 
Knowledge (Gkn), Quantitative Knowledge (Gq), Reading/Writing Ability (Grw), 
Short-Term Memory (Gsm), Long-Term Storage and Retrieval (Glr), Visual Processing 
(Gv), Auditory Processing (Ga), Olfactory Abilities (Go), Tactile Abilities (Gh), 
Psychomotor Abilities (Gp), Kinesthetic Abilities (Gk), Processing Speed (Gs), Decision 
Speed/Reaction Time (Gt), and Psychomotor Speed (Gps). However, o f the Stratum II 
abilities, G f  and Gc are the most related to g  (Carroll, 2003).
Although the CHC model was forwarded by McGrew (1997) to pragmatically 
classify narrow cognitive ability measures that are contained in individually administered 
intellectual assessments, this model is the most theoretically sound and empirically 
supported model of intelligence available (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; McGrew, 
2009; Stankov, 2000). For instance, the factor structure of CHC is supported by factor 
analytic evidence that not only demonstrates the consistency of the factors derived, but 
the invariance of the three-stratum factor structure across one’s life (Bickley, Keith, & 
Wolfle, 1995) and across gender, ethnic, and cultural groups (Carroll, 1993). Likewise, 
evidence provided from studies o f developmental, neurocognitive, and heritability lend 
support to the CHC model (Horn & Blankson, 2005). As such, the CHC model is backed 
by a more extensive array o f validation evidence than any other modem theory of 
cognitive ability (Schneider & McGrew, 2012).
The core practice in scientific fields is the classification of empirical observations 
(Bailey, 1994). As argued by Miller (1996), useful taxonomies draw distinctions of 
conceptual importance, raise contrasts that enable empirical advancement, and possess 
elements that form a coherent whole. Given the substantial amount o f evidence
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supporting the structure o f the CHC model, the value o f such a model is the common 
framework that allows practitioners to think alike regarding the measurement of cognitive 
abilities and the usefulness o f the broad vs. narrow facets. The CHC model is particularly 
relevant to the area o f school psychology and psychoeducational assessment as several 
measures o f cognitive abilities have incorporated CHC as a theoretical foundation. For 
instance, CHC provides researchers a means to design and evaluate cognitive assessments 
and a common language for describing research findings that stimulates the empirical 
investigation o f the structure and nature o f cognitive abilities (Keith & Reynolds, 2010). 
Theoretical Approaches to Intelligence
Despite the advances that have been made through the factor analysis of test 
scores, some researchers maintain that theories of intelligence that are derived from such 
exploratory analyses fail to capture the extent of cognitive functioning. In contrast to 
factor analytical accounts, a variety of theoretical frameworks have been constructed that 
purport to better conceptualize and measure intellectual ability.
Successful Intelligence. While Boring (1923) famously stated that intelligence is 
what the tests test, Sternberg was dissuaded by conventional measures o f intelligence that 
consisted solely o f measures of analytical and memory items. Rather, Sternberg (2005) 
proposed a competing information-processing model that has received considerable 
attention. The Successful Intelligence theory, also known as Triarchic theory of 
intelligence (Sternberg, Grigorenko, Ferrari, & Clinkenbeard, 1999), suggests that 
traditional measures of cognitive ability focus too much on analytical abilities, ignoring 
creativity and practical thinking that allow an individual to deal effectively with the 
world. Sternberg acknowledged that the measures of analytical abilities and memory used
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in traditional measures of cognitive ability are important indicators of success in 
academic environments. However, to achieve success “one needs not only to remember 
and analyze concepts; also one needs to be able to generate and apply them” (Sternberg, 
2005; p. 190). As Sternberg argued, there is a multitude of ways for someone to be 
successful at their job. That is, people achieve goals though selecting, shaping, and 
adapting to their environment and contexts. What works for one person may not work for 
another, but successful people modify their environments or circumstances to exploit 
their skills and mitigate or eliminate their weaknesses. In contrast, the unsuccessful fail to 
capitalize on their limited talents.
Since each path to success is different, Sternberg (2005) argued that what is meant 
by intelligence will have a different meaning to each individual. Rather than an 
overarching general intelligence or g, success is achieved through the combination and 
utilization of varied forms of thinking, namely Analytical, Creative, and Practical 
intelligences. Analytical intelligence is used to analyze, judge, evaluate, compare, and 
contrast relatively familiar, but abstract problems. Creative intelligence is used to cope 
with relative novelty. Practical intelligence is used to select, shape, and adapt 
environments to suit oneself. As suggested by Sternberg (2005), the strong relationship 
noted between measures of g  and academic success is in part due to the failure of 
traditional measures to assess creative and practical intelligence.
Core to Sternberg’s theory are the universal component processes that contribute 
to the information processing required for analytical, creative, and practical thinking. A 
component is defined as “an elementary information process that operates upon internal 
representations o f objects or symbols” (Sternberg, 1977; p. 65). Components are thought
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to be universally applied across cultures, but their application will depend on the nature 
of the problem faced (Sternberg, 2004). The theory of successful intelligence proposes 
that three component processes underlie human intellect: Metacomponents, Performance 
components, and Knowledge-acquisition components. Metacomponents are the executive 
processes that are responsible for the identification of problems, strategizing a solution, 
monitoring progress towards a goal, and evaluating the effectiveness of the resultant 
solution. Performance components set the plans of the metacomponents into action. 
Knowledge-acquisition components are used to learn new declarative information and/or 
how to solve problems.
Although Sternberg (2005) has supplied evidence to support the efficacy of 
Successful Intelligence theory, the procedures used in these studies have met with strong 
criticisms, limiting the interpretability and veracity of evidence provided. For example, 
the measures o f the Sternberg Triarchic Abilities Test (STAT; Sternberg et al., 1999) are 
inherently unreliable (Brody, 2003). When corrected for range and unreliability, the 
correlations between the STAT and measures o f g  are highly related. Thus, Successful 
Intelligence appears to substantially related to g. Brody further demonstrates that 
Sternberg’s three forms of intelligence correlate at .62 or higher, indicating substantial 
overlap between the supposedly independent factors. Likewise, the measures fail to 
demonstrate convergent validity with other measures with which they should be 
theoretically related. Gottfredson (2002) strongly criticized Sternberg’s assertions, 
indicating that the authors “can support their...major theoretical propositions only by 
ignoring the most relevant evidence on g  and making implausible claims about practical
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intelligence'’ (p. 3). As such, the conclusions drawn by Sternberg that Successful 
Intelligence theory is measuring attributes independent o f g  are highly suspect.
Multiple Intelligences. However, Stenberg is not alone in the assertion that 
intelligence is not well explained by g. Dismayed by the fact that traditional measures of 
intelligence and academics in general focus predominantly on logical and linguistic 
abilities, Gardner (2011) proposed his theory of Multiple Intelligences (TMI). According 
to Gardner’s TMI, intelligence is often defined too narrowly, including only those 
capacities that are important for academic success. Rather, Gardner suggests that 
intelligence is better represented by a spectrum of abilities. In practice, people draw on 
one or more of these abilities at a time to produce outcomes or “end states.” For instance, 
Gardner and Hatch (1989) argue that few occupations rely on a single form of 
intelligence. A surgeon, for example, must be able to not only solve problems as they 
arise in an operating room, but also possess the manual dexterity to manipulate a scalpel 
to correct the issue. As such, the surgeon is drawing on multiple forms of intelligence to 
influence success on-the-job.
In its current form, TMI consists of nine distinct but closely related intelligences: 
Verbal-Linguistic, Logical-Mathematical, Spatial-Visual, Body-Kinesthetic, Musical, 
Naturalistic, Existential, Interpersonal, and Intrapersonal (Gardner, 2011). Since each 
form of intelligence is hypothesized to be independent o f all of the others, a person can 
be described by a unique intellectual profile of the nine intelligences, highlighting one’s 
intellectual strengths and weaknesses. Gardner advocates that academic environments 
and curricula be tailored to suit the needs of individual students and their pattern of 
intellectual abilities. Thus, schools will be equipped to identify and remediate a child’s
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weaker intelligence(s). However, since all intelligences are also interrelated, as one 
becomes more proficient in a specific area, all areas o f intelligence are enhanced. As 
such, Gardner believes that schools should be filled with a variety of interesting toys, 
books, games, and objects which can be manipulated and explored, thus providing 
students with a multitude o f options to explore the world and enhance their intellectual 
capacity. Many schools have adopted the principles of TMI, producing a substantial 
impact on the American educational system (Lubinski & Benbow, 1995).
Despite the acclaim and attention that Gardner’s TMI theory has obtained in 
academic settings, critics remain unconvinced of the merits of TMI. From a theoretical 
perspective, the fact that all o f the forms of intelligence are supposedly interrelated and 
performance in one area can promote growth in another supports the influence of an 
overall g  factor. In fact, Gardner’s intelligences correlate well with standard measures of 
intelligence (e.g., the Wonderlic Personnel Test) and form a substantial g-factor (Visser, 
Ashton, & Vernon, 2006). From a psychometric perspective, no empirical evidence has 
been provided to demonstrate the claims made by Gardner, nor has the theory been 
specified in enough detail to be effectively evaluated (Hunt, 2001). In Lubinski & 
Benbow’s (1995) critical review o f TMI, the authors note that Gardner has gone to great 
lengths to describe the various forms of intelligence reinforcing the face validity o f the 
theory. However, Gardner has failed to demonstrate that these intelligences are related to 
real world outcomes. Likewise, Gardner has failed to provide reliability estimates for any 
of his scales. Thus, any inferences that can be drawn from his measures’ relationship to 
outcomes are suspect at best. As such, until meaningful evidence supporting the 
reliability and validity o f TMI is available, it poses limited utility.
Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Successive. Derived from Luria’s 
(1966) organization of brain functioning, the Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and 
Successive (PASS) cognitive processing theory of intelligence (Naglieri & Das, 1997; 
Naglieri, Das, & Goldstein, 2014) focuses on how information is processed rather than 
the kinds of information that are processed. The PASS theory represents the integration 
of cognitive and neuropsychological research, positing four interrelated, yet distinct 
neurocognitive abilities associated with various regions of the brain. Planning is the 
ability to control and direct one’s thoughts and actions to obtain an efficient solution to a 
problem. Attention is the ability to direct one’s mental energy toward a target stimulus 
while inhibiting responses to competing stimuli. Simultaneous processing is the ability to 
integrate disparate parts into groups or an integrated whole. Successive processing is the 
ability to recognize and sequential or serially order information. Since various parts of the 
brain are involved in different kinds of information processing, the PASS theory does not 
allow for a higher order g-factor.
Proponents of the PASS model argue that planning has not been adequately 
measured by other intellectual instruments, resulting in the misspecification o f specific 
academic deficits associated with specific cognitive problems. As such, the Cognitive 
Assessment System (CAS; Naglieri & Das, 1997) and revised version (CAS-2; Naglieri 
et al., 2014) were developed, explicitly measuring processes that other psychometrically 
derived measures of intelligence have failed to assess.
However, despite the validation evidence supporting the criterion and 
construct-related validity o f the CAS and CAS-2, evidence indicates that the abilities 
measured by the PASS model are more consistent with the CHC model (Keith &
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Reynolds, 2010; Kranzler & Keith, 1999). Namely, when subjected to confirmatory 
factor analysis, the PASS model produces a poor fit to the data. When competing 
theoretical models are applied to the same data, the best model fit is provided by a 
third-order hierarchical model with a general factor (g) of intelligence at the top, an 
intermediate Planning/Attention factor, and four narrow facets associated with the PASS 
abilities. Moreover, although the PASS model was bom out of strong theoretical origins 
and designed to measure non-g related abilities, when students were administered 
measures, the g-factor derived from the CAS and g-factor o f the Woodcock-Johnson-III 
correlated at .98 suggesting that the two are nearly indistinguishable (Keith, Kranzler, & 
Flanagan, 2001). As such, the CAS appears to have the same measurement characteristics 
o f the widely replicated CHC models.
The Nature of g  and G f
Despite the attention that the theoretical accounts o f intelligence of have received, 
thus far none have shown the utility exhibited by the CHC model. Moreover, although 
theoretical models of intelligence deny the existence o f an overarching general mental 
ability, when critically analyzed, these models show substantial relationships with g 
(Brody, 2003; Keith et al., 2001; Visser et al., 2006). As such, despite attempts to 
measure aspects of intelligence that are independent of g, the construct continues to 
emerge. Thus, the measurement of g remains the best estimate of GMA.
As noted earlier, the strength o f the CHC model rests on its ability to serve as a 
bridge from theory to practice, guiding the design and selection o f cognitive ability 
instruments and batteries capturing the qualities that relate to our current understanding 
o f intellectual functioning. Through multiple replications and substantial validation
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efforts, the CHC model has emerged as the most complete, structurally sound, and valid 
model o f cognitive ability. Thus, most new measures of cognitive abilities are based on 
the CHC model, acknowledging its fidelity (Keith & Reynolds, 2010).
In order to capture the complete range of mental abilities, the CHC prescribes a 
battery of assessments that provide the mosaic measurement o f intellect. Given that the 
CHC model currently denotes 16 broad abilities and a host of narrower facets, a complete 
CHC-based assessment battery would necessitate a lengthy administration. In developing 
measures o f cognitive ability or any other psychological construct, test developers are 
faced with a tradeoff between thoroughness and accuracy. For example, the length of a 
test is directly related to its reliability (DeVellis, 2012). Using classical test theory, longer 
tests are inherently more reliable since they capture items of increasing redundancy. In 
doing so, error variance is reduced, providing a more focused and hence, reliable 
measure. Thus, it would seem that an infinitely long measure would be desirable. Yet, 
due to test taker fatigue, it is a commonly recommended practice in psychometrics to 
consider reducing the number of items in a scale once the reliability coefficient reaches 
an adequate threshold. This same sentiment is a consideration for assessment batteries 
where a universe o f items is possible, but the administration of a large number o f items 
will result in test taker fatigue. A developer o f a test of cognitive ability must balance the 
creation of a measure that covers the breadth of mental abilities with the expediency of 
producing useful and valid results.
The same tradeoff must be made when developing a more focused measure of 
general cognitive ability. Spearman’s psychometric g  is implied through the positive 
correlations among mental ability measures. Therefore, it is not possible to measure g
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with any single measure. Rather, intelligence is approximated through the aggregation of 
highly g-saturated measures (Carroll, 1993). Similarly, Ackerman et al. (2005) notes that 
the uses of a single measure o f cognitive ability raises the possibility that s factors will be 
captured in addition to g. Despite this, Ree, Earles, and Teachout (1994) have questioned 
the practicality and necessity o f obtaining a comprehensive estimate of cognitive ability 
through an extensive battery of mental measures. Likewise, Spearman recommended that 
the use o f a single highly g-saturated measure is preferable to the use o f several 
heterogeneous cognitive measures that capture a variety of abilities (Spearman, 1927).
At Stratum 11 o f the CHC model, G f  and Gc are the two most highly g-saturated 
broad abilities, with G f  more closely relate to g  (Carroll, 1993). As originally conceived 
by Cattell (1971), G f is used as a means to enhance other mental abilities, such as the 
accumulation o f Gc through focused attention. As asserted by Gustafsson (1984,1989, 
2001) and others, G f is indistinguishable from g  when subjected to confirmatory factor 
analyses. This suggests that fluid abilities represent the foundation of general 
intelligence. For instance, Arendasy, Hergovich, and Sommer (2008) tested the 
g-saturation o f the Stratum II factors, finding that G f is virtually identical to psychometric 
g. As such, G f  measures produce large g-saturations even without averaging over several 
subtests. Therefore, G f  can be thought o f as the raw horsepower o f cognitive functioning, 
indicative of general mental ability.
However, contrary to the contention made by Gustafsson (1984, 1989, 2001), g 
and G f  do not appear to be the same construct. Rather, Carroll’s (2003) analysis 
demonstrates that G /“ . . .is significantly separate and different from g, tending to 
disconfirm any view that G f  is identical to g” (p. 14). However, Carroll points out that the
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issue has not been completely resolved, speculating that it is likely difficult to develop a 
measure o f G f that is reliably independent of g, stating that "better tests o f G f  are needed 
to establish this factor as linearly independent o f factor g, if  indeed this is possible..." 
(Carroll, 2003, p. 19). Whatever qualities are associated with g, measures o f non-verbal 
reasoning and novel problem solving through the use of spatial elements and inductive 
reasoning seem to best capture it. As such, tests o f G f  are thought o f as good 
approximations of Spearman’s g  (Ackerman et al., 2005).
While the types o f items that best capture G f  are known, substantial confusion 
surrounds the measurement o f the Gc construct. Adding to the confusion related to its 
measurement, various terms such as crystalized intelligence, comprehension, and 
academic achievement are used by professionals to describe the construct (Keith & 
Reynolds, 2010). Gc implies a depth of knowledge that would describe someone who 
possesses a vast repository of information. However, as pointed out by Horn and 
McArdle (2007), measures o f Gc rarely measure beyond surface knowledge. Likewise, 
individuals who score well on Gc measures tend to have a wide breadth o f knowledge. 
Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish the Gc abilities of experts and those of 
individuals who have a superficial knowledge on a wide variety o f topics based solely on 
Gc scores. As such, Gc scores may not be as useful as believed.
There is also reason to believe that Gc is becoming less relevant as technological 
advances permeate society. Although Gc measures are good indicators o f academic and 
business success from which hard work can positively influence test scores, advances in 
computer technology can store far more information than any one person can accumulate, 
holding it accurately, securely, and cheaply. That is, while crystalized knowledge is a
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repository o f information that comes with experience and education, Fumham (2008) 
argues that the future belongs to quick-witted individuals who are able to think on their 
feet, adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, and reason effectively.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that at its core, g  is best tapped by G f  
measures. As indicated by Cattell (1971), G f  is the governor o f intellectual ability. Lesser 
abilities are dependent on the investment of Gf. Likewise, due to its high g-saturation, 
tests consisting of reasoning and novel problem solving abilities that are associated with 
G f should be the predominant item types for brief measures of GMA (Arendasy & 
Sommer, 2012; Carroll, 1993, 2003; Gustafsson, 1984, 1989, 2001).
The Power of Intelligence
The relationship between intellect and success is most noticeable in academic 
settings (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Dilchert, 2006) where measures o f intelligence are used 
in predicting exam scores, amount o f learning, and academic success in schools and 
universities, regardless o f the subject or specialty. Likewise, education has a strong 
reciprocal impact on intelligence (Ceci, 1991). This relationship is important because it 
leads to compounding life-advantages. As noted by Feldman (1966), individuals with 
more education seek out and acquire more information. For instance, individuals who 
obtain higher levels o f education use periodicals such as books, newspapers, and 
magazines to a greater extent than their less educated peers. This is the precise reason that 
higher cognitive ability promotes additional learning; higher levels o f g  are associated 
with increased exposure to information, which is in turn exploited to a greater degree 
(Gottfredson, 2004).
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Skeptics o f g  argue that intelligence is little more than an academic skill 
(Sternberg et al., 2000). However, the non-academic value o f g  has a clear and predicable 
influence on occupational attainment, social life, and even one’s life span (Deary, 2004; 
Gottfredson, 1997; Lubinski, 2004; O’Toole & Stankov, 1992; Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). 
This general cognitive ability or ability to deal effectively with cognitive complexity 
(Gottfredson, 1998) is the hallmark o f intelligence across contexts, allowing for the 
processing of information of any sort, constituting the backbone of human mental ability 
(Gottfredson, 2004). For example, the effects that cognitive ability has on problem 
solving and learning in everyday situations are robust (Gottfredson, 2002). Intellect is 
shown to predict important life outcomes such as incarceration, poverty, health, and 
mortality due to engaging in risky health behaviors (Gottfredson, 2004). Likewise, a 
variety o f important occupation-related outcomes such as job performance, income level, 
and occupational attainment are predicted by intelligence (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). 
Thus, the effects of g  are pervasive because it is highly transportable. In other words, 
there is a linear relationship between an individual’s level of g  and performance in 
school, work, and social situations (Gottfredson, 2004). The general effect o f this 
relationship results in greater life success, producing dividends across situations, time, 
and cultures (Gottfredson, 2004; Nettlebeck & Wilson, 2005).
As argued by Gottfredson (2004), life itself can be thought of as a cognitive 
abilities test. There are virtually no aspects o f our daily lives, no matter how trivial, that 
do not require the ability to reason, plan, or solve problems. For example, everyday 
activities such as reading the directions listed in a recipe, determining how much to tip a 
waiter at lunch, or reading a map exert a cognitive load, requiring the ability to reason
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and solve problems. As such, there are few situations where being less intelligent is 
advantageous. However, the choices that are made on a daily basis produce compounding 
returns that can result in large differences (Gottfredson, 2004). For example, there are 
many reasons why someone may fail a given task that are unrelated to cognitive ability, 
such as misreading the headline of a newspaper or becoming lost while looking at a street 
map in an unfamiliar city. The person may be distracted, tired, and/or hungry, but these 
effects tend to be transient and unreliable. Conversely, the effects of cognitive ability are 
pervasive and fairly consistent across life situations. Just as casinos know that small 
gaming odds in their favor can produce huge dividends over time, small edges in 
cognitive ability aggregate and produce large effects over a lifetime (Gordon, Lewis, & 
Quigley, 1988). Individuals with higher levels o f cognitive ability make better judgments 
by exercising better problem-solving and reasoning abilities in everyday situations (e.g., 
managing finances or reading a map). In contrast, individuals who are less adept at 
planning and budgeting slowly slip behind others who initially began with the same 
resources. As such, when this slippage occurs, it occurs in many realms o f life, producing 
pronounced effects. Moreover, these slippage effects are expected to become more 
pronounced as the world becomes increasingly connected (Cascio & Aguinis, 2005). 
Technological and societal advances have amplified the complexity of daily life, 
increasing the number of choices that must be made, placing a premium on cognitive 
ability (Gottfredson, 2003). As such, intelligence is more pervasive and inclusive than a 
narrow abstract skill that allows one student to shine academically where another 
languishes. Rather, cognitive ability is a broad intellectual capacity to interact with the 
world effectively.
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Intelligence in the Workplace
Measures o f cognitive ability are among the most predictively valid employee 
selection measures available to organizations (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Based on data 
collected on over 32,000 employees in a variety o f jobs conducted for the U.S. 
Department of Labor (Hunter, 1980; Hunter & Hunter, 1984), meta-analytic evidence 
indicates that the overall predictive validity of cognitive ability to job performance is .51 
for jobs o f median complexity (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Since performance data are 
only available for those applicants who are hired, Hunter, Schmidt, & Le (2006) estimate 
that the true validity coefficient of cognitive ability may be well over .60 once corrected 
for range restrictions.
The predictive validity of cognitive ability also rises as job complexity increases 
(Ones et al., 2006; Schmidt, Hunter, & Pearlman, 1981). The most complex jobs are 
those that are abstract, cannot be routinized, and are autonomous, thus allowing workers 
to exercise more discretion (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). As such, complex jobs place a 
premium on workers’ ability to reason, solve problems, and make judgments without 
supervision. For instance, Hunter and Hunter (1984) reported that the highest mean 
validity o f cognitive ability that they found was for professional-managerial jobs (.58), 
followed by highly technical jobs (.56), medium complexity jobs (.51), semi-skilled jobs 
(.40), and unskilled laborer (.23). Conversely, only in the lowest, least complex, and most 
routinized positions, do constructs such as tenure and psychomotor abilities better predict 
on-the-job performance than cognitive ability (Gottfredson, 2002). Moreover, since the 
utility o f a selection device is directly tied to its validity (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), the 
dividends of using valid selection devices can reach millions o f dollars over time,
whereas organizations that make poor decisions using invalid instruments stand to lose 
millions o f dollars in reduced production.
The relationship between possessing a high intellect and employment success has 
been known to researchers for quite some time. For example, Harrell and Harrell (1945) 
noted that employees o f lower intelligence were less likely to rise up the organizational 
hierarchy to obtain the prestigious “white-collar” positions. This assertion is buttressed 
by U.S. Employment Service data, showing a strong correlation (.72) between cognitive 
ability and job level (Jensen, 1998). However, cognitive ability has also been shown to 
predict job movement into positions o f either higher or lower complexity. For instance, 
using a sample o f 3,887 young adults, Wilk, Desmarais, and Sackett (1995) demonstrated 
that cognitive ability measured in 1980 predicted job movement over a five-year period 
(1982-1987). Specifically, the results of this study show that individuals with greater 
cognitive ability tended to move up the organizational hierarchy while those with less 
cognitive ability moved down. In a follow-up study, Wilk and Sackett (1996) found that 
job mobility was predicted by the congruence o f cognitive ability and job complexity. 
Individuals who possessed a cognitive ability that was greater than the complexity of 
their job tended to move into positions o f greater complexity. Conversely, individuals 
who possessed a cognitive ability that was less than the level o f complexity of the job 
tended to move into less complex positions. Likewise, greater variability in cognitive 
ability scores are seen in less complex positions, but a consistent upper range o f scores 
are found across occupations suggesting a minimal level of intellect is required as one 
rises in the hierarchy (Harrell & Harrell, 1945). Thus, while people of high intelligence 
occupy low complexity jobs, access to higher-level positions require greater levels of
34
cognitive ability. This point is also echoed by Gottfredson (2004) who indicates that in 
the United States, the most coveted and highest paying jobs go to the cognitive elite, 
while the less cognitively endowed workers are doomed to a life o f menial labor and low 
pay in our informationally based economy. As such, it quite literally pays to be smart.
The relationship between cognitive ability and job success is not limited to the 
United States. The findings o f Schmidt and Hunter (1998) and Ones et al. (2006) are 
reinforced by Salgado, Anderson, Moscoso, Bertua, and De Fruyt (2003) who conducted 
a similar meta-analytic investigation of the relationship between intelligence and 
on-the-job performance in a European sample consisting of over 25,000 workers. After 
corrections were made for measurement error, the findings o f this study suggest that the 
operational validity o f cognitive ability is .62, but the value was smaller for specific 
forms of intelligence. Similarly, Bertua, Anderson, and Salgado (2005) and Hulsheger, 
Maier, and Stumpp (2007) examined cognitive ability in British and German samples, 
respectively. Consistent with previous findings, the data revealed that as job complexity 
increases, the predictive validity o f cognitive ability increases. In sum, not only do the 
data suggest that cognitive ability is the single best predictor o f occupational success for 
any occupation or industry, but cognitive ability is the best predictor o f job performance 
internationally too.
Why Does Cognitive Ability Affect Performance?
Although the link between cognitive ability and job performance is strong, why is 
the relationship so robust? As suggested by Schmidt and Hunter (2004), cognitive ability 
is thought to influence performance indirectly. Cognitive ability allows for the faster and 
more thorough absorption o f essential job knowledge. In turn, the information learned is
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exploited to a greater degree, allowing employees to go beyond their current knowledge 
of the job and to make judgments in novel and changing situations. Similarly, Borman, 
Hanson, Oppler, Pulakis, and White (1993) suggest that the relationship between 
intelligence and job performance is mediated. Higher intelligence results in individuals 
having more opportunities to obtain additional job experience. The experience gained 
then leads to additional job knowledge.
Given the vast amount of evidence showing the relationship between cognitive 
ability and job performance, it is no surprise that higher cognitive ability is also related to 
employee training outcomes. Schmidt & Hunter (1998) report that no other measure has 
the predictive power of cognitive ability (r = .56) in predicting training success.
Moreover, similar results (r = .54) were found when intelligence was used to predict 
training performance in European samples (Salgado et al., 2003). Thus, when an 
employer uses cognitive ability as a selection measure, the employer is also selecting 
individuals who are better able to rapidly learn on the job. Consequently, Schmidt and 
Hunter (1998) recommend that cognitive ability should be considered the primary tool for 
selection decisions.
Adverse Impact
Despite the high predictive validity and other advantages associated with 
cognitive ability testing, organizations remain hesitant to use such devices to make 
employment decisions due to the consistent and near universal finding that cognitive 
ability measures produce differential scoring across racial subgroups (Campbell, 1996; 
Hartigan & Wigdor, 1989; Sackett & Ellingson, 1997). Specifically, lower than average 
scores are observed in African-American and Hispanic samples, while groups such as
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Asian-Americans tend score higher than average (Rushton & Jensen, 2005). Comparing 
racial subgroups, African-Americans score about 1 standard deviation in the population 
lower than Caucasians, while Japanese and Chinese samples obtain the highest scores.
As a result, occupational outcomes can be partially explained by the gap in 
cognitive ability scores. According to Gottfredson (2002), only about 22% of Caucasians 
and 59% of African-Americans produce cognitive ability scores below 90. As such, fewer 
African-Americans are considered competitive for mid-level jobs and trades such as 
firefighters and clerical workers. The average cognitive ability score for incumbent to 
these types of jobs is one standard deviation above the average score of 
African-Americans. Conversely, on the other end of the continuum, the ratio of 
African-Americans to Caucasians producing cognitive ability scores of 125 or greater is 
1:30 the average for the most socially desirable professional positions such as lawyers, 
physicians, and engineers.
Despite the racial gap in cognitive ability scores noted in the general population, 
McDaniel and Banks (2010) argue that for two reasons, these differences should be less 
pronounced when actual job applicants compete for jobs. First, individuals at the lowest 
levels of cognitive ability do not have the mental capabilities to perform effectively in 
common jobs and therefore are not job applicants. Second, job applicants must meet 
minimal job requirements (e.g., education and experience) when applying for a position. 
Pools of qualified job applicants who have obtained formal education and possess the 
requisite relevant job experience are more likely to be homogenous in respect to 
cognitive ability than random samples drawn from the general population. Therefore, due 
to the pre-screening of applicant qualifications, larger racial gaps in cognitive ability
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scores are more likely to be found in lower level jobs that do not require lofty education 
and experience requirements. Conversely, smaller racial gaps should be noted in 
positions that require high levels of education and experience. Substantiation o f this 
assertion is provided by Roth, BeVier, Bobko, Switzer, and Tyler (2001) who note that 
the standardized mean difference between white and black applicants shrinks from 1.0 in 
the general population, to .86 for low complexity jobs, .72 for medium-complexity jobs, 
and .63 for high-complexity jobs.
Despite the reduction in test score differences seen across job complexity, the 
observed deviations can still cause disparate hiring practices if cognitive ability measures 
were used as the sole selection instrument. As such, challenges to the legality of cognitive 
ability testing began in 1971 with the influential Griggs v. Duke Power (1971) case. As a 
result of this case, the Supreme Court ruled that when a selection procedure or device 
produces adverse impact against a protected group, the organization must be able to 
demonstrate that the use of the measure is a “business necessity,” imperative to 
organizational functioning and operation. However, as indicated by Grover (1996), courts 
have generally held rather narrow interpretations on what constitutes a business necessity 
that hamper the use o f alternative selection options. As a result, many organizations 
curtailed their usage o f cognitive ability measures in making employment decisions.
The Measurement of Cognitive Ability 
Despite the legal challenges that surround cognitive-ability measures, Nisbett et 
al. (2012) believe that the measurement o f intelligence is one o f the greatest 
accomplishments of psychology. As stated by DeVellis (2012), “measurement is a 
fundamental activity o f science” (p. 2). As such, despite cognitive theorists who have
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devised theoretical accounts of intelligence that elude measurement, Cronbach (1990) 
notes, “If a thing exists, it exists in some amount. If it exists in some amount, it can be 
measured” (p. 34).
The History of Testing and Measurement
The historical roots o f measurement stretch into antiquity. Duncan (1984) argues 
that measurement is an inherently social process that emerged in ancient humans as a 
means to overcome the problems faced on a daily basis as opposed to an attempt to 
satisfy scientific curiosities. For example, ancient people were able to determine basic 
measurements such as length, distance, volume, weight, and time as a means to solve 
practical problems (Duncan, 1984). This assertion is backed by biblical references to the 
use of measurement and the writings o f Aristotle mentioning civil officials checking 
weights and measures.
The first documented use o f psychological testing dates back to 2,200 B.C. China 
where public officials were obligated to participate in civil service examinations every 
three years (DuBois, 1970). This competitive exam system assessed a variety of 
competencies such as archery, military affairs, agriculture, horsemanship, revenue, 
geography, music, writing, Confusion principles, knowledge of ceremonies, and civil 
laws. Examinees who scored well obtained appointments to governmental positions. 
Although these exams were rudimentary by modem standards, anecdotal evidence 
suggests a positive impact was produced, reducing the biases associated with nepotism 
and other political manipulations.
Darwin. Nevertheless, the roots o f intelligence testing are embedded in the work 
of evolutionary theory and the use of systematic observation. According to Charles
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Darwin’s theory of evolution, the natural environment cannot support the reproductive 
capacity o f organisms, leading to a struggle to survive (Darwin, 1859). Non-systematic 
mutations in the offspring of organisms result in variations or individual differences. 
These differences provide the offspring with adaptations which are more or less 
conducive to survival (Mader, 1996). As a result, when placed in a given environment, 
the characteristics that promote survival evolve through a natural process. Thus, over 
time, species undergo a slow transmutation whereby the characteristics that are associated 
with survival in a habitat occur with greater regularity.
Through his systematic observations o f the variations across species, Darwin set 
in motion the development o f scientific and statistical methods, producing a widespread 
impact on the field o f modem psychology (Hergenhahn, 2009). For example, the roots of 
child and developmental psychology, comparative psychology, learning, abnormal 
psychology, testing and measurement, and, o f course, evolutionary psychology can be 
traced directly to Darwin. In doing so, Darwin stimulated a curiosity in studying 
individual differences, raising questions regarding the link between human and animal 
intelligence.
Galton. The next major leap in the study o f individual differences was advanced 
by Darwin’s half-cousin, Francis Galton. Galton shared Darwin’s infatuation with 
systematic observation (Clayes, 2001). In fact, Galton was so enamored with 
measurement that he attempted to measure a variety of phenomena such as the 
effectiveness o f prayer (he did not find it effective), the degree o f boredom at science 
lectures, and determine which country had the most beautiful women (Galton, 1883).
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Galton is also credited with suggesting the use of fingerprints as personal identification, a 
practice later adopted by Scotland Yard (Forrest, 1974).
However, Gabon’s greatest advances to the field of measurement came when he 
opened the Anthropometric Laboratory in London’s Health Exhibition. Visitors to the 
laboratory paid three or four pence each to have their sensory and motor abilities 
assessed, or for a smaller fee (two pence) an individual could be measured again at 
another time. In a little over a year, Galton collected measures on 9,337 subjects on 
variables such as height (standing), height (sitting), weight, arm span, lung capacity, pull 
strength, grip strength, keenness o f sight, speed o f blow (the time taken for someone to 
punch a pad), color discrimination, memory o f form, hand steadiness, length o f the 
middle finger, and auditory acuity (the ability to perceive or discriminate auditory tones) 
(Hergenhahn, 2009; Hothersall, 1995). Each individual received a copy o f the results and 
Galton kept a copy on file (Irvine, 1986). Later, these data lead to the development of 
core statistical concepts such as correlation, regression to the mean, and the realization 
that as compared to mean (average) scores, median scores were less influenced by 
extreme scores (Bynum, 2002).
Galton was primarily interested in the inheritance o f anatomical and cognitive 
abilities. According to Galton, intelligence was related to sensory acuity (Forrest, 1974). 
That is, the outside world is taken in through the senses. As such, individuals who 
possess keen senses were better able to acquire information. Since Galton believed that 
one’s sensory acuity was directly related to intelligence, his laboratory is seen as the first 
effort to measure intelligence. However, Galton’s contribution to the field of 
measurement is further realized through substantial methodological advances such as the
development of the first assessment battery, a collection of sensory and motor measures. 
Likewise, many psychometric instruments in use today can be traced back to the work of 
Galton including rating scales, questionnaires, and self-report inventories (Hergenhahn, 
2009).
Cattell. The popularization of psychological measurement in the United States is 
traced to the work o f James McKeen Cattell. In addition to forming the first 
undergraduate psychology laboratory in the United States at the University of 
Pennsylvania, Cattell coined the term “mental test” (Cattell, 1890; Cattell, 1928; 
Hergenhahn, 2009). Moreover, Cattell is largely responsible for the encouragement of 
mental-testing research through his founding of several influential publications such as 
Psychology Review Science and American Men o f Science. Likewise, Cattell founded 
the Psychological Corporation, which continues to be an industry leader in psychological 
testing and assessment.
From a methodological standpoint, Cattell introduced some critical assumptions 
about the validity o f cognitive ability measures. For example, Cattell noted that if 
Galtonian measures were all measuring the same thing (i.e., intelligence), then they 
should all be highly correlated. Likewise, if  a test is measuring intelligence, then it should 
demonstrate a substantial relationship with other indices of intelligence such as academic 
success. However, through his research, Cattell noted that Galtonian measures failed to 
demonstrate substantial relationships with one another or with other practical measures of 
intelligence such as college success (Guilford, 1967; Sternberg, 1990). As a result, 
sensory measures were deemed invalid indicators o f intelligence and the interest in such 
measures faded.
Binet. Unlike Galton and Cattell who relied on sensory abilities as a proxy 
measure of intelligence, Alfred Binet proposed the study o f mental abilities directly, by 
measuring higher mental processes through the use of variables such as memory, 
imagination, imagery, comprehension, attention, suggestibility, aesthetic judgment, force 
of will, moral judgment, and visual space judgment. Binet and Theodore Simon were 
commissioned by the French government to study children with mental retardation in 
French schools, culminating in the development of the Binet-Simon Scale of Intelligence, 
consisting of 30 tasks arranged in order o f difficulty (Fancher, 1985). The measure was 
able to distinguish the performance of normal functioning and mentally delayed children, 
but later revisions also distinguished levels of intelligence in normal children, and 
provided normative information on adults (Siegler, 1992). Coupled with the addition of 
William Stem’s coining of the term “mental age,” a child’s intelligence quotient (IQ) 
could be calculated as the child’s mental age as derived from the Binet-Simon, divided by 
their chronological age (Fancher, 1985; Hergenhahn, 2009). The scale was again revised 
again by Lewis Terman, this time for American test takers, and validated against 
academic achievement ratings demonstrating the veracity o f the test (Minton, 1988). The 
revised measure created by Terman is known as the Stanford-Binet Scale (Roid, 2005; 
White, 2000) and remains a measure o f cognitive abilities.
Yerkes. The next major advance in cognitive assessment came as World War I 
dawned. The United States Army was faced with the problem of systematically 
evaluating and classifying the cognitive ability and emotional functioning o f new soldiers 
(Boake, 2002). The influx of young men into the Army necessitated a method to quickly 
and efficiently assess and identify soldiers for selective training (e.g., officer training).
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Robert Yerkes became familiar with intelligence testing while working at the 
Boston Psychopathic Hospital, suggesting a new scoring method to the Binet-Simon scale 
in which test takers are administered all items o f the Binet-Simon scale, receiving credit 
(points) for the items passed (Hergenhahn, 2009). As such, intelligence could be 
measured by the items passed rather than by IQ, removing age as a factor and broadening 
the statistical analyses that could be performed leading to higher quality inference. 
However, the scoring and administration system devised by Yerkes had another benefit. 
Since the administration of the scale was not dependent on the age or ability level of the 
test taker, the items could be administered in a group setting.
When commissioned to develop an assessment device for soldiers, Yerkes 
maintained that such a test must measure innate intelligence and be easily administered 
and scored. The result was the Army Alpha, introduced in 1917, measuring verbal ability, 
knowledge or information, and ability to follow directions (Dahlstrom, 1985). A 
non-verbal equivalent version of the measure, the Army Beta, was introduced and 
administered to illiterate and non-English speaking soldiers. When testing was halted in 
1919 following the end o f the war, over 1.75 million people had been tested (Larson, 
1994; McGuire, 1994). The success o f the Army Alpha and Army Beta has led to the 
widespread use of group testing in schools and industry.
Cognitive Ability Testing in the Modern Era
Riding on the success of the Army Alpha and Army Beta, the use of 
paper-and-pencil cognitive ability measures has gained considerable popularity. The most 
commonly used measure o f adult intelligence is the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
currently in its fourth edition (WAIS-IV; Wechsler, Coalson, & Raiford, 2008).
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Explicitly, Wechsler’s tests are designed to measure “the global capacity o f a person to 
act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his/her environment” 
(Wechsler, 1939, p. 229). As such, the WAIS-IV, which consists o f 15 subtests, is 
primarily used in clinical settings due to the lengthy administration time, which is 
typically well over an hour. However, in occupational settings, where shorter measures 
are preferred, a comprehensive measure is neither required nor feasible 
(Chamorro-Premuzic, & Fumham, 2010).
Currently, the most widely used cognitive ability instrument in personnel 
assessment is the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT; Hunter, 1989; Wonderlic, 1992; 
Wonderlic, 2007). The WPT is a brief measure of cognitive ability that can be completed 
in approximately 15 minutes. Examinees are asked to answer as many of the 50 
free-response verbal, quantitative, and spatial ability WPT items as possible within the 
allotted time limit (12 minutes). Despite its popularity, the relationship between WPT 
scores and intelligence is unclear. For instance, Bell, Matthews, Lassiter, and Leverett 
(2002) examined the relationship between WPT scores and the Kaufman Adult and 
Adolescent Intelligence Test (KAIT) finding the Wonderlic to be a robust predictor of 
both G f  and Gc. Conversely, Matthews and Lassiter (2007) conducted a similar study, 
examining the relationship between WPT scores and the Woodcock-Johnson-Revised 
(WJ-R), demonstrating that the Wonderlic is related to Gc but not Gf. As such, while 
WPT scores have been shown to reliably predict acquired knowledge, WPT have not 
been shown a reliable predictor o f novel reasoning abilities. Likewise, the predictive 
power o f WPT scores may be sample dependent whereas measures o f G f  demonstrate
45
robust relationships regardless o f the administration samples (Hicks, Harrison, & Engle, 
2015).
Another popular measure of cognitive ability, the Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
Test (RPMT; Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003), is considered by some to be the best single 
measure o f G f and GMA available (Jensen, 1998; Nisbett et al., 2012). The RPMT is a 
“test o f observation and clear thinking” (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1978, p. 3), requiring 
the examinee to inspect a matrix o f geometric shapes linked by a common rule and 
extrapolate the next figure in the matrix that would satisfy the rule from several 
alternatives. Consisting o f 60 items, the RPMT can be administered in 20 minutes and 
has been used extensively in the United States and the United Kingdom to make 
personnel selection decisions (Bertua et al., 2005; Jensen, 1998; Raven, Court, & Raven, 
1998). Due to the non-verbal nature o f the RPMT, it can be used across cultures without 
the need for item translations. As such, the terms culture-free (Cattell, 1940), culture-fair 
(Cattell & Cattell, 1963), and culture-reduced (Jensen, 1980) are all used to describe the 
Raven’s and other similar non-verbal measures that require little cultural knowledge to 
answer test items. The advantage o f culture-fair measures o f cognitive ability is that they 
are thought to reduce the adverse impact seen in more culturally-loaded cognitive 
measures. Although culturally-fair tests have thus far not been shown to eliminate the 
adverse impact associated with measures o f cognitive ability (Arvey & Faley, 1988), 
evidence suggests that reductions in adverse impact are obtainable using such measures 
over global intelligence measures (Hausdorf, LeBlanc, & Chawla, 2003).
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Computer-Based Testing
Over the last 20 years, affordable, reliable, portable, and powerful computers have 
become a ubiquitous feature of our modem society, as seen in the omnipresence of 
desktop computers, laptops, tablets, and smartphones (Chernyshenko & Stark, 2015). 
Coupled with advances in online technology, computers offer an array o f possibilities in 
the selection and presentation of assessment items, as well as where testing takes place 
(Sireci & Zenisky, 2006; Zenisky & Sireci, 2013). While early computerized assessments 
were little more than direct translations o f paper-and-pencil measures (Barak & English, 
2002), researchers are creating innovative computerized assessments that take advantage 
of the computing power afforded by such ubiquitous devices (e.g., Condon & Revelle, 
2014). The technological revolution has led computerized assessment to rival the use of 
traditional pencil-and-paper methods as the dominate medium (Weiss, 2011).
No longer are assessments restricted by the limitations associated with traditional 
paper-and-pencil methods, such as static text statements and graphics. Rather, stimuli can 
be presented either audibly through computer speakers/headphones or graphically, 
moving through space on a computer monitor. The dynamic capabilities o f computers 
allow for the creation and presentation o f creative item formats previously unavailable to 
test developers. For example, three-dimensional computerized simulations and digital 
media are increasing the range of knowledge, skills, and other attributes that can be 
measured (Bartram, 2006; Jacobs & Chase, 1992; Zenisky & Sireci, 2002). Likewise, 
complex items that change over time can be created to improve the coverage of the 
constructs measured and their associated cognitive processes (Drasgow & 
Olson-Buchanan, 1999; Parshall & Harmes, 2009). For example, measures can be made
of mouse or joystick movements or the time that elapses between item presentation and 
response, expanding the type and amount o f information that can be obtained regarding 
test taker performance. As such, not only can the veracity of an examinee’s response be 
called into question if only a few milliseconds elapsed between presentation of the item 
and the elicitation of a response (i.e., he or she did not read the question), but 
computerized testing allows for the complex scoring of the processes associated with 
producing a response (DiCerbo & Behrens, 2012).
Beyond the innovative item formats that are afforded by computerized testing, 
when coupled with the worldwide reach of the Internet, the benefits to organizations are 
staggering. For instance, organizations can reach a vast pool of potential applicants 
around the globe using a variety of measures without incurring the costs associated with 
printing and distributing measures via mail (Naglieri et al., 2004). As such, Internet-based 
test administration is more scalable and efficient than traditional pencil-and-paper 
measures all while presenting a consistent and positive image or culture to applicants o f a 
company that uses advanced technology to staff employees (Tippins, 2009). Online 
measures also promote the standardization o f measurement, uniformly presenting all test 
items in the exact same manner while improving the speed of processing applicants 
(Drasgow & Mattem, 2006; Drasgow & Olson-Buchanan, 1999; Tippins, 2009; Thurlow, 
Lazarus, Albus, & Hodgson, 2010; van der Linden & Glas, 2010). Due to these immense 
advantages, organizations see computer and Internet-based testing as an appealing 
alternative to traditional paper-and-pencil measures (Karim, Kaminsky, & Behrend,
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Test Security Specific to Technology-Based Testing
Despite the advantages associated with computerized assessment, as with any 
technological advance, new and exploitable security threats arise. These security threats 
have caused some organizations to be hesitant to completely abandon the use of 
paper-and-pencil measures (Castella-Roca, Herrera-Joancomarti, & Dorca-Josa, 2006). 
Test security refers to a number of issues surrounding the test taker’s ability to “cheat” or 
manipulate assessment scores through tactics such as possessing prior knowledge o f the 
items, using outside sources, or using outsiders to answer test items (Karim et al., 2014). 
Online assessment is typically conducted in an unproctored testing environment, 
providing examinees a multitude of options to cheat, such as surfing the Internet or 
communicating with others to locate test answers (Al-Saleem & Ullah, 2014). Likewise, 
the proliferation o f technological devices, such as smart phones, allow test takers to 
photograph, record, or otherwise document test content, and receive information virtually 
undetectably even under proctored conditions (Reynolds & Dickter, 2010). As such, 
although similar results are obtained from cognitive measures administered on computers 
and via traditional paper and pencil methods (Mead & Drasgow, 1993; Randall, Sireci,
Li, & Kaira, 2012), practitioners and researchers have raised concerns that unproctored 
environments provide too great an opportunity to cheat. Consequently, test developers 
have warned against the administration o f cognitive ability measures via online media 
(Naglieri et al., 2004).
Test security is a critical issue for test developers because it directly affects the 
validity o f a measure (Foster, 2010). The use o f impermissible sources or possessing 
prior knowledge of test items artificially inflates an examinee’s score on the construct of
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interest. When compared to the scores of examinees that did not benefit from such a 
nefarious advantage, it erroneously appears that differing levels of the construct of 
interest are possessed. As such, any judgments or inferences based on compromised 
measures cannot be justified (Karim et al., 2014). Likewise, reductions in a test’s validity 
directly affect its utility, which can have staggering financial implications for 
organizations (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).
Security threats can be classified into six general categories of cheating (Foster,
2010). Threats include pre-exposing the test taker to test content, using a proxy to take 
the test, receiving help from someone at the exam center, using inappropriate aids during 
the assessment, hacking into the scoring database to raise or lower test scores, and 
copying the responses of another person during the exam. All of these methods represent 
an inappropriate or possibly illegal way in which test takers have attempted to inflate 
their assessment scores. However, none of these threats is limited to computer-based 
testing (Meyer & Zhu, 2013) and as such should not deter organizations from using such 
measures. Rather, these concerns shed light on designing and implementing improved 
methods to mitigate or eliminate such risks.
The most serious threat to exam security concerns test takers obtaining prior 
exposure to the test content (Foster, 2010). As compared to other threats to test security, 
prior knowledge o f test content is often obtained inexpensively and with relative ease 
making it difficult to discriminate between honest and dishonest test takers. Moreover, 
the risk o f being caught with prior knowledge of test content is extremely low. For 
example, an examinee may be provided information regarding the types o f questions 
asked or specific item content and the associated correct answers prior to the
administration. This form of cheating may be accomplished on computerized assessments 
by taking screenshots or otherwise documenting the items administered and then 
subsequently sharing the content with future test takers (Cook & Eignor, 1991). This 
problem is further compounded as testing windows become larger as is seen when 
organizations must continuously screen applicants (Croft, 2014). For instance, if 
thousands o f examinees complete a measure comprised o f the same items, the risk of 
sharing items increases greatly over time. This phenomenon was observed on a large 
scale by Asian students sitting for the Graduate Records Exam (GRE; Kyle, 2002). 
Examinees sitting for the exam at the beginning o f the testing window copied exam 
content and shared it via online message boards. As a result, abnormally high scores were 
observed in the following months from countries such as China. Alarmed, GRE officials 
launched an investigation and uncovered websites containing exact test item content. As 
a result, the computerized version of the GRE was discontinued in the region, allowing 
only the paper-and-pencil version. Similarly, many organizations use only a single test 
form from which personnel decisions are based. As such, given a short measure, 
likeminded conspirators could memorize an entire scale in only a few administrations 
(Drasgow et al., 2009).
Combating Test-Security Issues
Traditionally, item sharing and other test security concerns have been combated 
by creating multiple forms of the same measure (Cook & Eignor, 1991). For example, 16 
alternate forms o f the WPT are available for use (Wonderlic, 1983). However, 
developing alternate forms is costly in both the time and financial resources required to 
generate them. As such, few alternate test forms are in use today (Freund & Holling,
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2011). Moreover, while multiple forms may reduce an examinee’s ability to memorize 
items from one administration to the next, developing parallel forms that are o f similar 
content, difficulty, and reliability through traditional test development methods is 
virtually impossible, resulting in inequities across test forms (Cook & Eignor, 1991). 
Therefore, despite attempts to improve test security and fairness, test developers could 
inadvertently create a measure that is unfair in other respects.
Another method used to curb cheating is computer adaptive testing (CAT; Weiss,
2011). CAT creates a personalized test administration tailored to the examinee’s ability 
level (Baylari & Montazer, 2009). Based on item response theory (IRT) methodology, 
CAT assumes that the test taker’s ability level (i.e., amount of the latent trait) can be 
estimated by administering items of varying levels o f difficulty. Examinees that possess 
greater ability levels of the latent trait are more likely to pass items of higher difficulty. 
Conversely, individuals with lower levels of the same trait may only pass items of lesser 
difficulty. Likewise, items that more finely discriminate a test taker’s performance at a 
given ability level are said to provide more information at a given ability level since the 
ability level in question is tested more precisely. CAT takes advantage o f IRT scaling by 
administering items of greater or lesser difficulty until the test taker’s ability level can be 
estimated with an acceptable level of certainty (Babcock & Weiss, 2012; Weiss, 2011). 
Given that different items are administered to different examinees, some of the issues 
surrounding test security are addressed, but inequities in the items presented across test 
administrations may still exist. Likewise, advanced item exposure methods have sought 
to reduce test security concerns by controlling the frequency with which items are 
presented to specific geographic regions or time periods by adjusting a control parameter
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of an item exposure algorithm based on repetitive simulations (Chang & Ansley, 2003). 
However, CAT and item exposure algorithms do not prohibit test users from 
photographing or otherwise recording the items and distributing them to future test users. 
As such, given a large enough samples o f test takers, test security in a CAT environment 
with exposure controls remains an issue necessitating the continual monitoring o f item 
statistics to locate abnormal improvement in examinee performance (Drasgow &
Mattem, 2006).
While the use of multiple test forms and CAT have been shown to reduce 
small-scale cheating, these methods require very large item pools (Drasgow et al., 2009). 
For instance, it is estimated that at least 2,000 items are needed to administer a 40-item 
CAT licensure exam twice a year (Breithaupt, Ariel, & Hare, 2009). As such, human test 
developers are strained to keep up with the demand for high quality items. Item 
generation is also a time consuming and costly process (Geerlings et al., 2011; Wainer, 
2002). For instance, it is estimated that 10% of Educational Testing Service’s (ETS) total 
testing costs are directly related to item writing (Wainer, 2002). Rudner (2009) suggested 
that development costs associated with the generation of a single item for a high-stakes 
licensure exam range from $1,500 to $2,000. As such, when Breithaupt et al.’s (2009) 
estimated number of items needed to create a 40-item item bank is combined with 
Rudner’s (2009) cost-per-item estimate, the cost o f the development o f a high-stakes 
examination could reach $4,000,000.
However, not all items are created equal and the items generated by human test 
developers are often o f questionable quality. The items created by human content 
specialists do not always conform to the construct o f interest, nor can humans develop
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items that are o f greater difficulty than they can conceived, placing a ceiling on the range 
of items that are possible (Homke & Habon, 1986). The costs associated with test 
development are further increased as a substantial number of the items created by human 
developers must be eliminated from the item pool due to insufficient psychometric 
characteristics. For instance, Henryssen (1971) estimates that between 20 percent to 80 
percent o f the items generated by human test developers must be discarded during the test 
development process due to flaws. Thus, the use o f automatic test development 
procedures has gained increased attention for the creation o f cognitive ability measures, 
which are known to contribute to the prediction of occupational success (e.g., Schmidt & 
Hunter, 2004).
Automatic Item Generation
Given the need to quickly and efficiently generate large pools o f items, automatic 
item generation (AIG) is a rapidly advancing field with roots in cognitive theory, 
computer technology, and psychometrics (Bejar et al., 2003). Also known as rule-based 
item construction, AIG is an alternative approach to traditional item development using 
computer technology to generate items based on item models and a set o f rules (i.e., 
algorithm) that define item complexity (Gierl et al., 2015). The aim of AIG is to generate 
a large number o f items that require little or no human review prior to administration 
(Doebler & Holling, 2015). Developing items in an AIG framework solves several of the 
practical issues associated with traditional test development. For instance, given an item 
model and a set of rules, AIG increases the flexibility o f test administration through the 
generation of large pools of items of varying complexity with a negligible investment of 
time and money, reducing item exposure concerns (Geerlings et al., 2011). Additionally,
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since the items are generated through algorithms, precise information regarding how the 
items were constructed, their relation to the construct in question, and their psychometric 
properties is known (Geerlings et al., 2011). Moreover, the variety of AIG item types that 
can be created is ever expanding with research supporting their psychometric 
characteristics and test-retest applications (Arendasy & Sommer, 2013; Freund &
Holling, 2011). As such, AIG is an attractive method for developing cognitive ability 
items (Freund, Hofer, & Holling, 2008; Poinstingl, 2009).
Under the AIG paradigm, item models (Bejar, 2002) serve as the basic structure 
upon which future items will be generated. Item models are either selected from exiting 
measures or uniquely created in such a way that the features of the model can be 
manipulated to create new items (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012; Gierl & Haladyna, 2012). 
That is, new items are generated from item models by specifying the construct-relevant 
features that can be varied, providing researchers a foundation for making inferences 
regarding test taker ability (Alves, Gierl, & Lai, 2010; Gierl et al., 2015).
Item model features known as “radicals” (Irvine, 2002), maximize the 
content-related variance in the items generated. That is, radical features define the 
processes or actions required to answer items. It is assumed that radicals systematically 
impact the psychometric characteristics (e.g., item difficulty) o f items since they are 
selected based on the cognitive processes that test takers use to solve items. That is, 
radicals define the elements that are critical to solving an item and thus relate directly to 
item difficulty. Items that share radicals of the same complexity also share the same 
psychometric characteristics, such as measuring the same construct and item parameters 
(Doebler & Holling, 2015). Moreover, radicals can be varied independently o f one
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another or used in tandem to generate an array of items that exhibit varying psychometric 
qualities (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012; Gierl et al., 2015). As such, researchers can create 
items of varying difficulty by manipulating of one or more radical elements. Thus, 
radicals improve the usefulness o f the inferences that can be drawn from test taker 
performance since they allow for a widened range of the content domain to be tapped 
(Alves et al., 2010).
Unlike radicals, “incidentals” serve as the basis for generating variation in the 
surface features of items (Irvine, 2002) that do not directly relate to item difficulty. 
Incidentals do not exert an effect on the psychometric characteristics of an item, but 
rather change the “look” o f items, creating variation within items of the same difficulty 
(Bejar et al., 2003). As such, the similarity among items with regard to psychometric 
characteristics is caused by radicals whereas item dissimilarity in terms of item 
appearance is caused by incidentals.
While it is a basic assumption of AIG that the effect o f radicals affect test-taker 
performance in a similar way, this assumption may not hold in specific situations 
(Geerlings et a l ,  2011). That is, test takers may use different strategies to arrive at the 
same solution. In such circumstances, researches familiar with the cognitive processes 
used to answer items, as well as the radicals and incidents used to generate items, may 
not the potential for interference among the generative elements. As such, functional 
constraints (Arendasy et al., 2008) can be specified to omit certain combinations of 
radicals and/or incidentals that produce invalid test items, or items that interfere with the 
cognitive processes required to answer the question (Geerlings et al., 2012). For example, 
a researcher creating a mathematical ability measure may constrain the largest number
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that will be used in multiplication items to be less than 10 and omit all items that require 
the test taker to multiply by zero. These constrains not only serve as a quality control 
mechanism in AIG, but also avoid the generation of items that lead to solving items 
through the use of cognitive processes unrelated to the construct o f interest and potential 
differential item functioning (Penfield & Camilli, 2007).
Moreover, since radicals exert a consistent effect on item difficulty, the effects of 
the radicals can be used to pre-calibrate items. As such, through the generation of items 
directly from previously calibrated item radicals and the random application of 
incidentals, items can be generated on the fly with predicable psychometric 
characteristics (Bejar et al., 2003). On-the-fly item generation is advantageous in that a 
large number o f items are created in a fully automated fashion directly from calibrated 
radicals that define the item or item families (Geerlings et al., 2012). Moreover, test 
security concerns are lessened in that each test taker is provided a unique experience.
Item Model Development
As is the case in traditional item development, the expertise and creativity o f 
content specialists is critical to designing meaningful AIG item models (Gierl, Lai, & 
Turner, 2012). Several published examples of the procedures and methods that 
researchers have used to generate item models exist (e.g., Arendasy & Sommer, 2012; 
Doebler & Holling, 2015; Freund et al., 2008; Geerlings et al., 2012; Gierl et al., 2015). 
However, despite the range o f available tactics, AIG item modeling best practices is an 
under-researched area (Gierl & Lai, 2012).
As described by Arendasy and Sommer (2012), the number o f useable items that 
are generated is related to the theoretical backing o f the item model used in item
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construction. According to the authors, three AIG methods have been successfully used 
to generate cognitive ability items: (a) item modeling, (b) cognitive design system 
approach, and (c) automatic min-max approach.
Item modeling. Using the item-modeling approach, the researcher begins by 
selecting existing items from an operational measure. These parent items, also known as 
item models (Bejar, 2002), have radical features that can then be systematically varied to 
produce isomorphic iterations of the item. Due to their similarity to the parent item, the 
items created from this process are known as item clones (Glas & Van der Linden, 2003). 
Likewise, the item cloning process can be used to generate item sets or families of items 
that look different from one another, but are generated by the same combinations of 
radicals (Geerlings et al., 2011), resulting in item families that share similar psychometric 
characteristics. In theory, the newly created items would not need to be calibrated since 
their parameters can be drawn from known family distributions (Geerlings et al., 2011). 
Item modeling has been successfully used by ETS to supplement existing item pools. For 
example, Bejar (2002) developed a measure of quantitative ability through AIG item 
modeling methodology in which the researchers examined an existing pool o f GRE 
quantitative items, choosing a subset o f which to create item models.
The benefit o f such an approach is that a test taker cannot simply memorize or 
solve the item by remembering an earlier solution (Gierl et al., 2015). For instance, a 
series o f geometry items requiring the test taker to find the area o f a rectangle could be 
created by simply changing the length o f each side. Likewise, as indicated by Drasgow, 
Luecht, & Bennett (2006), item modeling, or the weak theory o f item modeling, is well 
suited for a wide variety of content domains where few theoretical descriptions of the
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cognitive skills required in solving problems exist or unique item types are required. 
However, a drawback to this practice is that a large percentage o f the items generated 
must be eliminated due to insufficient psychometric characteristics. Likewise, a relatively 
limited number of psychometrically distinct items can be created through the item 
modeling process. Since cloned items are vulnerable to the effects of test coaching 
(Morley, Bridgeman, & Lawless, 2004), and the ease with which examinees are able to 
recognize such items, the practice o f item modeling is viewed negatively and regarded as 
overly simplistic (Gierl et al., 2015).
Cognitive design system approach. A more advanced approach to AIG relies on 
cognitive theory to guide item model construction. This strong theory of item model 
development (Irvine, 2002) begins with the examination and specification o f the radicals 
that can be systematically varied on the basis of a cognitive model. As such, the level o f 
difficulty resulting from the use of radicals can be predicted and subsequently tested to 
evaluate the contribution that the radical has to the prediction of item difficulties and to 
verify the use o f the cognitive model. Subsequently, new item models are constructed to 
overcome the limitations exhibited by the current measure and the validity o f the newly 
created item model is reexamined (Embretson, 2005). The use o f cognitive theory and 
associated cognitive processes to guide decisions regarding which radicals will be 
manipulated as part o f the item model is what differentiates this method from the weak 
theory item modeling approach.
The primary benefit of using a strong theoretical approach is the reduced need for 
extensive pilot testing since the factors that govern item difficulty can be specified, 
modeled, and controlled, allowing for the prediction o f item difficulty (Gierl & Lai,
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2012). Likewise, through the structured use o f a cognitive model, item generation is 
enhanced through established empirical studies of cognitive functioning and 
individual-differences research. However, in practical applications, a considerable 
number of the items generated through the cognitive system design approach must be 
removed due to insufficient psychometric characteristics (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012). 
This issue is compounded due to the lack of available cognitive theories to guide item 
model development (Lai, Alves, & Gierl, 2009), limiting the use of the cognitive design 
system approach to narrow content domains such as mental rotation (Bejar, 1990) and 
abstract reasoning (Embretson, 2002). As such, similar to item modeling, researchers 
often resort to selecting items from existing measures to use as item models and 
constructing additional items that do not interfere with the other items, further restricting 
the number and quality o f the items that can be generated (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012).
Automatic min-max approach. In order to overcome the limitations and loss of 
items resulting from insufficient psychometric characteristics associated with the item 
modeling and cognitive design system approaches, the automatic min-max approach was 
developed as a more sophisticated method o f AIG which builds construct relatedness 
directly into the item construction process (Arendasy et al., 2008; Arendasy & Sommer,
2012). Compared to the cognitive design approach, the cognitive model specified in the 
automatic min-max approach initially covers a greater range of possible item formats, 
opening the possibly of a variety o f innovative item types to tap the latent construct. As 
argued by Drasgow et al., (2006), AIG item modeling should be guided by the same 
design principles that are used in traditional test development (e.g., Downing &
Haladyna, 2006). For example, the first step in traditional scale development is the clear
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statement o f the latent construct that is intended to be measured from which future items 
can be written (Hinkin, 1998). Likewise, the first step in producing an item model 
through the top-down automatic min-max approach is a clear statement of the latent 
construct being measured along with the specification of the cognitive model that details 
the relevant knowledge, cognitive processes, and solution strategies that characterize the 
latent trait. Based on the cognitive model, the researcher then selects an item format to 
measure the latent trait. The cognitive model is then reduced to a more specific cognitive 
item model. This reduced model specifies the radicals that are thought to trigger the 
cognitive processes required to solve the item. Additionally, functional constraints are 
specified to omit specific item radicals and incidentals that may interfere with the 
cognitive processes o f interest. As such, the automatic min-max approach is 
differentiated from the cognitive design approach through the use of a quality control 
mechanism and has been used to successfully generate algebra problems (Arendasy & 
Sommer, 2007), figural matrices (Arendasy & Sommer, 2005), mental rotation (Arendasy 
& Sommer, 2010), number series (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012), and English and German 
word-fluency (Arendasy, Sommer, & Mayr, 2012) items with little to no loss in items due 
to insufficient psychometric characteristics.
Procedural Framework of the Automatic Generation of 
Analogical Reasoning Problems 
As detailed by Arendasy and Sommer (2012), the automatic min-max approach to 
AIG-model development includes the specification o f the latent trait under consideration; 
choice o f item format; specification of the cognitive model; and specification o f the 
radicals, functional constraints, and incidentals. Likewise, items of the type discussed in
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the following section require the generation of alternative answer choices. This section 
describes the procedural framework of item model construction for the experimental AIG 
measure used in this study.
Definition of the Latent Trait
Previous research has indicated that G f is closely related to g  and is characterized 
by the ability to solve novel problems and adapt to new situations (Cattell, 1957, 1971; 
Gustafsson, 1984, 1989, 2001; Schneider & McGrew, 2012). Measures that best capture 
G f  are relatively culture-free, non-verbal, spatial measures o f inductive reasoning 
(Carroll, 2003; Sattler, 2001). To clarify, inductive reasoning is the ability to identify 
trends or patterns and extrapolate this information to reach a logical conclusion (Raven, 
1938). In contrast, deductive reasoning is the ability to apply one or more given rules to 
obtain a solution (Shye, 1988). Therefore, inductive reasoning entails the discovery of 
relationships while deductive reasoning does not. As modeled by Spearman (1938), 
inductive-reasoning items are solved by examining the elements of a problem, 
determining the logical relationships between them, and extrapolating these relationships 
to other elements. As such, the abilities associated with inductive reasoning are typically 
measured by tests consisting o f analogies, classifications, matrices, and series (Goldman 
& Pellegrino, 1984; Sternberg & Gardner, 1983; van de Vijver, 1991).
Choice of the Item Format
In order to capture the latent trait and capitalize on AIG methodology, the 
researcher chose a unique analogical item type. Analogical reasoning is the ability to 
draw relationships between objects in one context and use this information to explain the 
same relationship in another context (French, 2002; Holyoak, 2005). As such, the
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substantial cognitive component o f tasks such as these is the integration o f multiple 
complex relationships (Robin & Holyoak, 1995). Closely related to Raven’s-type tasks 
(Snow, Kyllonen, & Marshalek, 1984), analogical reasoning items require the examinee 
to describe, generalize, or explain new phenomena based on familiar concepts, and serves 
as a basis for dealing with novelty. Thus, the ability to reason through analogy is critical 
for everyday situations and is closely linked to G/'(Duncan et al., 2000; Holyoak & 
Morrison, 2005; Prabhakaran, Smith, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997).
In the current study, the experimental AIG measure of G f  was assessed through 
the use of analogical reasoning number sets (See Figure 1). The choice o f the item type 
was not taken lightly. In order to create a measure as devoid o f cultural influences as 
possible, numbers were chosen as a medium due to their near universal use (Porter,
1995). While numbers are used to represent values or quantities, it can be argued that 
other symbols (e.g., letters, arrows, shapes) may impart unintended representations 
depending on the cultural lens from which they are viewed (Bradley, 2010). As compared 
to other symbols, numbers provide a means to assess examinee G f  abilities through 
symbols that are familiar to most cultures.
In the experimental AIG measure, examinees were presented with a series of 
automatically-generated number sets consisting o f three numbers in an A:B::C:D (A is to 
B as C is to D) sequence. Specifically, a randomly generated number set is presented in 
Term A. In Term B, the number set is transformed according to one or more “rules.” The 
examinee’s task is to identify the rule(s) that govern the number set transformation from 
Term A to Term B. The examinee is then asked to apply the previously identified rule(s)
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to another randomly generated number set in Term C to obtain the number set that would 
occupy Term D from three multiple-choice alternatives.
1011 1 2 : 1 3 1 4 1 5
! ( 1 2 1 4 1 6 : _________|
i
1 6 1 4 1 2
1718 19
18 20 22
Figure 1. Sample Experimental AIG Measure Item
Specification of the Cognitive Item Model
The cognitive processes that are involved in solving analogical reasoning items 
can be arranged into a series of stages (Evans, 1968; Mulholland, Pellegrino, & Glaser, 
1980; Sternberg, 1977). Although various models and terms have been used to describe 
the cognitive processes associated with answering analogical reasoning items 
(Mulholland et al., 1980), Sternberg’s (1977), cognitive process and naming conventions 
are used below. In the first stage, Encoding, a mental representation of the individual 
terms of the analogy are created, allowing further mental operations to be performed. In 
the second stage, Inferring, the relationship between the corresponding attributes o f first 
two terms (A -  B) is inferred and stored in working memory. In the third stage, Mapping,
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the relationship between the first and third terms (A and C) is discovered and, likewise, is 
stored in working memory. In the fourth stage, Application, the relationships discovered 
in the Inferring and Mapping stages are used to identify the correct answer for the fourth 
term (D). In an optional stage, Justification, particularly used in answering True-False 
analogical reasoning items (e.g., Mulholland et al., 1980), the previous stages are checked 
to determine if an error is made or to determine if additional information is required to 
answer the question. In the final stage, Response, an answer is physically selected or 
marked on an answer sheet from response alternatives.
Specification of Radicals, Functional 
Constraints, and Incidentals
The automatic min-max approach to AIG item model development requires the 
formal specification o f the radicals, functional constraints, and incidentals that promote 
content representation within the items generated (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012). Each of 
these elements is described in this section.
Radicals. As previously described, radicals define the processes or actions 
required to answer items. As such, radicals relate to the difficulty o f the items generated. 
Primi (2001) describes the complexity factors that influence the difficulty o f G/items. 
These complexity factors are analogous to item radicals in AIG methodology. Primi 
details four complexity factors: the number o f elements, the number o f rules, the types of 
rules, and the perceptual organization o f items. The “number o f elements” refers to the 
number o f attributes contained in an item, while the “number o f rules” refers to the 
number o f radical elements that are invoked by a given item. Both o f these factors are 
associated with the cognitive load that is placed on the operational capacity o f working
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memory (Mulholland et al., 1980; Salthouse, 1994). As noted by Carpenter, Just, and 
Shell (1990), participants completing matrices items decompose the items into smaller 
sub-goals, requiring participants to track an increased number o f elements in order to 
satisfy higher goals. Thus, as additional attributes and rules are applied to items, strain is 
placed on the limited capacity o f working memory. The “types of rules” refers to the 
complexity of the content that is applied to the item attributes. For example, Jacobs and 
Vandeventer (1972) created a taxonomy o f the transformations that can be used to 
manipulate figural matrices items. These transformations range from simple rules (e.g., 
changes in object size) to complex transformations (e.g., adding matrices attribute) that 
influence item difficulty. However, as noted by the authors, in practice, matrices items do 
not cover the content domain well in that certain transformations tend to be 
overrepresented or oversampled. Finally, “perceptual organization” refers to the visual 
complexity or esthetics o f the items. As described by Primi (2001), “visually harmonious 
items display perceptual and conceptual combinations that represent congruent 
relationships between elements, whereas nonharmonic items tend to portray competitive 
or conflicting combinations between visual and conceptual aspects that must be dealt 
with in reaching a solution" (p. 51). For example, Carpenter et al. (1990) noted that 
misleading cues such as superposed elements in matrices items increase item complexity. 
Likewise, Primi (2001) demonstrated that over 50% of the variance in item complexity is 
accounted for by perceptual organization.
Number o f  elements. The experimental AIG measure was designed to allow for 
the lengths of the number sets used to be variable. However, for practical purposes, the 
number sets in the current study were restricted to three numbers. Since the number o f
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elements included in each item is consistent, the length o f the number sets is not expected 
to exert a cognitive load on examinees.
Number o f  rules. The number sets used in the experimental AIG measure were 
generated according to a set of rules described in the next section. Since it is possible to 
generate items that result from the application of one or more rules, additional cognitive 
load is expected to be exerted as additional rules are applied to the analogical numbers 
sets.
Type o f  rules. The type of rule applied to the number sets should also influence 
item difficulty. In order to link and manipulate the terms o f the experimental AIG 
measure, mathematical operations were applied to the number sets. Namely, consistent 
mathematical operations and mixed mathematical operations were used as radicals. 
Consistent mathematical operations included problems in which the examinee was 
presented with a randomly generated number and then addition was applied to obtain the 
second number in the sequence; the third number was then obtained by again applying 
addition to the second number (e.g., 1 5 - 1 6 - 1 7 :  2 2 - 2 3 -  24). The same consistent 
mathematical operation applied if subtraction was used to obtain the second number from 
the first, and the third from the second. Conversely, mixed mathematical operations 
consisted o f items in which addition (or subtraction) was applied to the first number to 
obtain the second, and then the opposite mathematical operation subtraction (or addition) 
was applied to the second number to obtain the third (e.g., 14 -  16 -  12 : 20 -  22 -  18). 
Likewise, numbers within the number series could duplicate. As such, the duplication of 
numbers will also be used as a radical.
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Perceptual organization. As noted by Primi (2001), the perceptual organization 
of item stimuli substantially impacts item difficulty. As such, the visual complexity of the 
automatically-generated number sets is expected to influence the overall difficulty o f the 
items. For example, number sets that maintain the same perceptual organization across 
terms (e.g., 7 -  8 -  9 : 12 -  13 -  14) are expected to be less difficult than items in which 
the perceptual organization o f the items is flipped between terms (e.g., 5 - 6 - 7 : 1 4 - 1 3  
-  12). As such, the visual dissimilarly o f the numbers within a number sets should 
influence item difficulty.
Functional constraints. Functional constraints are specified to minimize the 
influence o f unintended cognitive processes in solving AIG items. The goal o f functional 
constrains is to enhance the construct relatedness o f the AIG items created such that the 
abilities other than that of the construct of interest are removed from the item model. As 
such, the AIG items created conform more closely to the intended construct.
Based on the item type and cognitive model, the constraints placed on the AIG 
item model can take many forms. For instance, the random numbers contained in the 
number sets will be constrained to two digits (10-30) to control the cognitive complexity 
o f the items generated (Horn & Noll, 1997). Likewise, ambiguous items that permit more 
than one solution should be prohibited (Scharroo & Leeuwenberg, 2000). That is, it is 
conceivable that AIG items could be generated in which a correct solution and a 
distractor number series are identical. In this case, a comparison can be made between 
answer choice alternatives. If two answers are identical, another item can be generated. 
Similarly, studies of analogical reasoning tasks demonstrate the effect o f stimulus 
priming on task performance (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2002; Spellman, Holyoak, &
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Morrison, 2001; Wharton, Holyoak, & Lange, 1996). Therefore, the radicals presented to 
the test takers should be randomized to mitigate the effects of pre-exposure o f identical 
radicals.
Incidentals. Incidentals are designed to create variation in item appearances, but 
have no effect on item difficulty. In the current study, item variation is achieved by 
randomly generating numbers to populate the number sets.
Distractor Generation
As in traditional test development, AIG item difficulty is dependent on producing 
distractors that are plausible enough to be endorsed (Doebler, 2015; Downing & 
Yudkowsky, 2009). For example, in developing a static multiple-choice measure, 
incorrect options that are endorsed by at least 5% percent o f test takers are considered 
“functional distractors” while response options that are endorsed to a lesser degree add 
little value to a measure (Downing & Yudkowsky, 2009). In AIG, algorithms are used to 
create distractors (Gierl et al., 2012). However, simplistic strategies such as randomly 
selecting items from the universe o f options will result in items that are too easy since the 
correct option is easily identified (Doebler, 2015). Rather, the psychometric soundness of 
AIG measures can be improved by systematically switching or removing the radicals or 
combinations o f radicals that were used to generate the item stem (Arendasy & Sommer, 
2005; Doebler, 2015). For example, if  the numbers in Term C are linked by adding 2, a 
distractor item may fail to add 2 or add a number other than 2 to generate an incorrect 
option for Term D. As such, controlled variation is produced in the response options, 
masking the correct answer and improving the measurement o f the construct o f interest. 
While the procedures just mentioned represent the current best practices in AIG, the
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effects that distractors have on the psychometric properties o f items is difficult to 
ascertain and is an under represented area o f researcher (Gierl et al., 2012).
Formulation of the Problem 
The purpose o f the current research is to build on the existing AIG 
methodological framework through the construction and validation of an on-the-fly 
measure of cognitive ability that is generated at the time of item presentation. In order to 
fulfill this purpose, the proposed measure will be developed using the automatic min-max 
approach (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012). Next, the psychometric characteristics and the 
nomological network of the experimental AIG measure will be examined. The general 
expectations are that the proposed measure will demonstrate unidimensionality and 
construct relatedness and will correlate with other measures of G f
A fundamental concern in the development of a psychological instrument is the 
establishment of the unidimensionality o f the measure. Dimensionality refers to the 
number of latent traits that contribute to responding to the items of an instrument 
(DeVellis, 2012). Commonly, the dimensionality of psychometric instruments is 
evaluated through the use o f exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. However, as 
recommended by Arendasy and Sommer (2012), the unidimensionality o f AIG measures 
can be assessed through the use o f the Rasch model as a prerequisite for testing the 
constructed relatedness o f AIG items. The fit of the data to the Rasch is examined 
through the use o f likelihood ratio tests (e.g., Andersen, 1973; Martin-Lof, 1973), which 
relate the likelihood o f the item parameter data to a null model. If the tests fail to reach 
significance, then the hypothesis that the experimental AIG measure demonstrates Rasch 
model fit can be retained. As such, Hypothesis 1 concerns the dimensionality o f the
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experimental AIG measure. It is expected that the experimental AIG measure will display 
unidimensionality.
Hypothesis 1: The experimental AIG measure will display unidimensionality.
Construct representation (Embretson, 1983) concerns the identification o f the 
theoretical operations that contribute to performance on a measure. For AIG measures, 
the construct representativeness of a measure is determined by examining the effects that 
the specified item radicals contribute to item difficulty (Embretson & Daniel, 2008; 
Freund et al., 2008; Gierl & Haladyna, 2012; Poinstingl, 2009). As such, construct 
representation provides evidence supporting the inclusion of the item radicals in the item 
model since these elements are hypothesized to affect item difficulty. Thus, initial 
evidence for the construct representation of the experimental AIG measure is established 
through the examination of these features (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012). The ultimate 
goal is to produce a model that accounts for as much item difficulty as possible, based on 
the features of the item model (Gierl & Haladyna, 2012). As such, Hypothesis 2 concerns 
the content representation of the experimental AIG measure. It is expected that the item 
radicals specified will predict item difficulty.
Hypothesis 2: The experimental AIG measure will display satisfactory construct 
representation.
Hypothesis 2a: Consistent Mathematical Operations will significantly predict 
item difficulty.
Hypothesis 2b: Mixed Mathematical Operations will significantly predict item 
difficulty.
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Hypothesis 2c: Duplicate Numbers will significantly predict item difficulty.
Hypothesis 2d: Flipped Relationships will significantly predict item difficulty.
In traditional test-development applications, test-retest reliability is commonly 
used to demonstrate the stability o f test scores across administrations (Anastasi & Urbina, 
1997). As noted by Shuttleworth (2009), measures of cognitive ability are good 
candidates for such analyses because it is unlikely that participant ability level will 
suddenly change. Thus, it is expected that participants will obtain similar scores across 
test administrations. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 concerns the temporal stability of the 
experimental AGI measure.
Hypothesis 3: The experimental AIG measure will show adequate test-retest 
reliability.
Another method used to demonstrate the validity o f a measure is to examine its 
nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). As described by Campbell and Fiske 
(1959), convergent validity provides an indication that a measure shares a substantial 
relationship to other measures to which it should be theoretically related. As noted 
previously, non-verbal and culture-free measures of inductive reasoning best capture G f 
(Carroll, 2003; Sattler, 2001). As conceived by Thurstone, tasks such as Letter Sets and 
Number Series tap inductive reasoning abilities well (Freedheim & Weiner, 2003). When 
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis, along with matrices measures, a substantial G f 
factor is formed by Letter Sets and Number Series tasks (Hicks et al., 2015). The purpose 
of this series of analysis is to examine the criterion relatedness of the experimental AIG 
measure. As such, Hypotheses 4a and 4b concern the predictive relationship shared 
between the experimental AIG measure and established measures o f cognitive ability. It
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is expected that the experimental AIG measure of G f will correlate with other measures 
o f Gf.
However, G f  is also known to share a relationship with demographic variables.
For instance, previous research indicates that G f tends to decrease with age (Cattell,
1943). Therefore, Hypothesis 4c concerns the predictive relationship shared between the 
experimental AIG measure and examinee age. It is expected that the experimental AIG 
measure o f G f will correlate negatively with examinee age.
Hypothesis 4: The experimental AIG measure will demonstrate satisfactory 
criterion validity.
Hypothesis 4a: The experimental AIG measure will significantly predict scores 
on the Letter Sets task.
Hypothesis 4b: The experimental AIG measure will significantly predict scores 
on the Number Series task.
Hypothesis 4c: The experimental AIG measure will demonstrate a significant 
negative relationship with examinee age.
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CHAPTER 2 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL AIG MEASURE
The development of the experimental AIG measure began with a content analysis. 
The purpose of the content analysis was to identify the item radicals, incidentals, and 
functional constraints that could be manipulated and controlled. Four content specialists 
who hold advanced degrees in psychological sciences served as subject matter experts 
(SMEs) in this analysis. SMEs were provided with a definition of the latent trait, the 
cognitive model, and a prototypical item model. SMEs were then asked to examine the 
item model and verbally describe the process an examinee would take to solve a given 
item. Likewise, SMEs were asked to indicate the various elements of the item model that 
could be varied in order to trigger the appropriate solution strategy. Using the information 
provided by the SMEs, radicals, incidentals, and functional constraints were specified. 
Generative Matrix
Based on the information obtained from the content analysis, the experimental 
AIG measure was created using the PHP programing language, a popular open source 
server-side scripting language (PHP.net, 2016). In order to generate the analogical 
reasoning items, first, a randomly-generated base number was produced for each of the 
four analogical reasoning terms (A through D) and multiple-choice alternatives. Base
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number values were constrained to numbers between 10 and 30 in order to reduce the 
cognitive load associated with interpreting number values greater than two digits in 
length and to add perceptual uniformity to the look of AIG items. Likewise, this 
constraint served to eliminate the possibility o f negative values. These randomly- 
generated numbers were intended to serve as incidental elements, creating variation in 
how the items look without affecting difficulty. Next, term manipulation numbers were 
randomly generated for use in subsequent mathematical manipulations. These term 
manipulation numbers were used to create patterns in the analogical reasoning terms. 
Term manipulation numbers were constrained to values between 1 and 4 in order to limit 
the cognitive load associated with adding and subtracting numbers o f lower or higher 
values. The term manipulation values of Terms A and B were identical as were the values 
for Terms C and D. For instance, if  the number 4 was generated to manipulate Term A, 4 
was also used to manipulate Term B. Likewise, if  the number 3 was generated to 
manipulate Term C, 3 was also used to manipulate Term D.
Next, mathematical and logical manipulations were applied to the base numbers 
using the term manipulation numbers as controlled by an item generation matrix. The 
item generation matrix consisted o f 14 variables (See Table 1) dictating item and 
distractor construction. The leftmost column represents the item being generated. The 14 
columns to the right (labeled 1 through 14) represent the variables manipulated to 
generate the items. In the table, each variable is listed below the aspect o f the item that is 
controlled. Further clarification on how the items are generated is presented in the 
following paragraphs.
The mathematical manipulation between the first and second value of each term 
was controlled by Variable 1. Variable 1 could take one o f three values (1 = subtraction;
2 = addition; 3 = duplicate). For example, suppose the base number for Term A was 10 
with a term manipulation number of 3. The value of Variable 1 dictates if  3 is added or 
subtracted from 10. If Variable 1 had a value of 2, 3 was added to 10 to generate the 
second value (13) in Term A. Likewise, if the value of Variable 1 was /, then 3 would be 
subtracted from 10 to generate the second value (7) in Term A. However, if instead the 
value of Variable 1 was 3, then the term manipulation number (3) would be ignored and 
10 would be a duplicated value (10). Variable 2 acted in the same manner, controlling the 
relationship between the second and third number in the term.
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Table 1. Item Generation Matrix
Item
Item
Gen FL FR Disl Dis2 Dis3 FD1 FD2 FD3 #Ds
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 2
3 1 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
4 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
5 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2
6 2 3 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 1 1 2 2 2
7 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 2
8 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 2
9 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
10 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 2
11 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
12 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2
13 3 1 2 1 3 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 2
14 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 2
15 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 2
16 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
17 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1 2
18 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 2
19 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 2
20 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
21 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1 2
22 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 2
Note. Item Gen = item generation; FL = flip left; FR = flip right; Disl = distractor 1; Dis 
2 = distractor 2; Dis3 = distractor 3; FD1 = flip distractor 1; FD2 = flip distractor 2; FD3 
= flip distractor 3; #Ds = number of distractors.
In addition to Variables 1 and 2 that generate differentiation in the pattern of 
numbers in each term, Variables 3 and 4 were used to influence the perceptual 
complexity of analogical reasoning items. These variables allowed for the pattern created 
by Variables 1 and 2 to be “flipped,” expanding the construct space, requiring the test 
taker to examine and draw relationships across item terms. For example, a term
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consisting of the numbers 1 5 - 1 6 - 1 7  could be inverted to 17 -  16 -  15 if indicated by 
Variables 3 or 4. Variables 3 and 4 could take one of two values (1 = no flip; 2 = flip) 
with Variable 3 controlling Terms A and C and Variable 4 controlling Terms B and D.
The remaining variables in the item matrix were used to generate item distractors. 
Variables 5 through 10 are analogous to Variables 1 and 2, controlling the generation of 
the pattern of numbers that comprise the three distractor terms. Variables 5 and 6 
controlled Distractor 1; Variables 7 and 8 controlled Distractor 2; and Variables 9 and 10 
controlled Distractor 3. The patterns of variable values were systematically manipulated 
to create plausible distractor choices. For example, if Variables 1 and 2 contained values 
of 1 and 2 respectively, Variables 5 and 6 may consist o f values 1 and 2, 2 and 7, 7 and 7, 
or 2 and 2. Additional variation in distractor items was produced by systematically 
manipulating the term manipulation number. For example, if the term manipulation 
number was 3, distractor items may contain values surrounding this value (e.g., 1,2, or 
4). Variables 11, 12, and 13 are analogous to Variables 3 and 4 controlling the “flip” of 
the terms in Distractors 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Thus, the “flip” variables applied to the 
distractors allow for additional variation and further mask the identification o f the correct 
answer. Additionally, constraints were placed on distractor terms eliminating the 
possibility that a distractor matched the correct answer. Finally, Variable 14 was used to 
indicate the number o f distractors to generate. Variable 14 could take on values o f 1, 2, or 
3 indicating how many distractors to generate. In the current study, this variable was held 
constant at 2, allowing for the presentation o f only two distractors and a correct answer. 
However, future research may examine the effects of greater or fewer distractors.
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The values of the 14 variables in the item generation matrix were counterbalanced 
to create uniform variation and broad construct coverage in the 22 AIG analogical 
reasoning item families and the multiple-choice distractors. Moreover, since item 
generation was controlled using an item matrix, precise information about how the items 
were constructed allowed for the precise testing of the radicals and incidental involved.
A 22-item measure comprised of the items generated from the item generation 
matrix was administered online along with a demographic form which asked basic 
information including age, gender, ethnicity, and educational attainment. Consistent with 
scale development best practices (DeVellis, 2012; Freund & Holling, 2011), a 
demonstration o f the rules (i.e., radicals) that were used to manipulate analogical 
reasoning terms was presented via an instructional video. Additionally, written 
instructions were made available to participants. As noted by Freund et al. (2008), tests of 
inductive reasoning frequently suffer from a lack o f clarity regarding the types o f tasks 
that are involved in solving items. For instance, the rules that govern the relationship 
between corresponding analogical reasoning terms must be discovered before the 
relationship discovered can be extrapolated (Sternberg, 1977). However, with no 
additional information, it is plausible that test takers may disagree on the rules that 
govern the relationship between terms. Thus, unintended rules may be applied to items 
that allow a test taker to reach a solution that is quite different from the “correct” 
solution. In order to avoid this issue, test takers can be presented information regarding 
the various rules that govern the relationship between analogy terms prior to test 
administration.
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In addition to clarifying the task, test fairness and accuracy o f the measure is 
increased since no participant is unfairly disadvantaged by misunderstanding the patterns 
imbedded in the items (Freund et al., 2008). As such, before the measure is administered, 
practice items were made available to participants, allowing them to become familiar 
with the task and item format that was used. Participants were allowed to complete as 
many practice items as they wished without time constraints. During the practice session, 
participants were provided feedback regarding the correctness o f each response.
After completing the practice session, the presentation o f the item radicals used to 
generate the 22-item experimental measure was randomized to control for order effects. 
Once participants selected a response, they were not able to return to the previous item.
In order to reduce examinee fatigue and to limit the amount of time taken to 
complete the experimental AIG measure, a pilot study was conducted to determine the 
amount o f time provided to answer each item. Participants (N  = 4) were asked to answer 
the items of the experimental AIG measure as quickly as possible. The mean response 
time was 16.51 seconds (SD = 8.45). As a result o f the pilot study, a 30-second time limit 
was established for examinees to answer each item.
Scoring
Raw scores for the experimental AIG measure were calculated using the 
following scheme. First, the average response time for items that were answered correctly 
was calculated from the total sample (M =  15.06 seconds). Due to its approximation of 
the midpoint o f the time allowed to answer the items, this figure was rounded down to 
15.00 seconds, and this served as a benchmark value. Next, a score o f 1 was awarded to 
participants who answered the item correctly and submitted their response prior to the
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benchmark value. A 0 was awarded for items that were either answered incorrectly and/or 
elicited a response after the benchmark value. Since the experimental AIG measure 
contained 22 items, scores could range from 0 to 22.
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1 
CONTENT VALIDATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The purpose o f the current research is to build on the existing AIG 
methodological framework through the construction and validation o f an on-the-fly 
measure of cognitive ability that is generated at the time of item presentation. In order to 
accomplish the aims of the research, three studies were conducted examining the 
construct representation, temporal stability, and criterion relatedness o f the scores 
produced by the experimental AIG measure. The aim of Study 1 is to assess Hypotheses 
1 and 2 relating to the unidimensionality and construct representation o f the experimental 
AIG measure.
Participants
The sample consisted of 333 respondents (193 male and 140 female) from the 
United States between the ages of 18 and 81 (M =  35.3; SD = 13.8). Guidelines for 
traditional scale development suggest that a sample o f approximately 300 participants is 
required to ensure the stability of the findings (Nunnally, 1978). Likewise, Downing 
(2003) indicates that a sample of at least 200 participants is required to assess Rasch 
model fit. As such, the size of the sample in the current study seems adequate.
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The majority o f the participants (80.8%) were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk). mTurk has become a popular crowdsourcing platform from 
which behavioral science researchers may solicit research participants (Chandler,
Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014). Previous research has indicated 
that the results obtained from mTurk workers are comparable to conventional sources of 
data collection such as convenience and snowball sampling (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). Likewise, previous scale-development 
initiatives have sourced mTurk workers as participants, producing scales with acceptable 
psychometric characteristic (Buhrmester, et al., 2011). The remaining participants 
(19.2%) were recruited via snowball sampling through social media. In exchange for their 
participation, participants sourced from mTurk were provided monetary compensation. 
Prior to data collection, a pilot study was conducted to estimate the average amount of 
time required to complete the experimental AIG measure. mTurk workers were 
compensated according to this time estimate and to the median minimum wage for the 
United States to ensure fair wage compensation. All participants were provided feedback 
regarding their performance on the AIG measure (number o f items answered correctly).
O f the sample, 76.6 % identified as White/Caucasian, 9.3% as African-American, 
6.9% as Hispanic-American, 2.1% as Asian-American, 0.6% as American-Indian, and 
8.4% as other. The reported educational attainment levels were as follows: 0.3% some 
school, no high school diploma; 13.2% high school diploma or equivalent; 18.9% some 
college credit; no degree; 3.9% trade/technical/vocational training; 10.8% Associate 
degree; 36.9% Bachelor’s degree; 11.1% Master’s degree; 1.5% Professional degree;
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2.7% Doctorate degree. The average time spent working on the test was 8:31 minutes (SD  
= 3:18 minutes) ranging between 2:21 and 25:27 minutes.
Procedure
Study data were collected via an online measure hosted by the researcher. In order 
to access the scale, participants were provided a link to the experimental AIG measure. 
Before beginning the measure, participants were presented with an informed-consent 
form stating the purpose o f the project, instruments involved, risks and alternative 
treatments, compensation (if any), and the contact information of the researcher. The 
letter of approval from the Louisiana Tech University institutional review board (IRB) is 
presented in the appendix. Participants were then asked to provide basic demographic 
information (age, gender, race, and educational attainment). Participants were instructed 
to answer items as quickly as possible and were given the opportunity to complete as 
many practice items as they wished. Practice items were administered without time 
limitations, and feedback regarding the correctness of responses was provided after an 
answer was selected. Once comfortable with the task, participants could advance to the 
actual experimental AIG measure. Participants were provided 30 seconds in which to 
respond to each item. If an answer was not submitted in less than 30 seconds, participants 
were automatically advanced to the next question. No feedback was given regarding the 
correctness o f items in the non-practice portion of the measure.
Results
Analyses were conducted using SAS 9.1, SPSS 17.0 (descriptive and correlational 
values), and RStudio (LLTM analysis). Prior to performing the analyses, item responses 
that were submitted in less than one second were recoded as missing data. These suspect
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responses were likely the result o f participants inadvertently double clicking the response 
button to the previous question. Since the presentation of the items was randomized, 
these suspect items can be classified as missing completely at random (Little & Rubin, 
2002). Maximum likelihood estimation was used to impute the missing data points. 
Previous research has indicated that maximum likelihood estimation is advantageous to 
other methods of handling missing data including listwise and pairwise deletion, as well 
as mean imputation techniques (Baraldi & Enders, 2010; Newman, 2003). Of the total 
sample, 70 o f the cases required the imputation o f one or more items. Subsequent 
analysis o f imputed and non-imputed cases revealed that the scores o f these measures 
correlated highly (r = .99). On average, participants answered 17.15 (SD = 4.30) o f the 22 
items correctly within the 30 seconds provided for each item. However, once the item 
scoring algorithm was applied, the mean score obtained on the measure was 9.20 (SD = 
5.12). A one-sample Kolmogorov-Smimov (p -  .001) and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .001) 
indicate that participant total score data were not normally distributed. However, after a 
visual inspection of a histogram plot (Figure 2), it was determined that the dataset 
exhibited sufficient normality (Howell, 2013).
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Histogram
Score
Mean =9.2 
Std. Dev. =5.121 
N =333
Figure 2. Histogram of Experimental AIG Scores
Previous research examining gender differences in G f  reveal no systematic 
differences (Colom & Garcia-Lopez, 2002). This is not to say that males and females 
perform equally well on all G f tasks. For example, meta-analytic evidence indicates that 
in adult samples, males tend to outperform females (d  = .33) on tasks such as Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices (Lynn & Irwing, 2004). In general, females tend to 
outperform males on verbal tasks while males outperform females on spatial-ability 
measures (Halpern, 1997; Neisser et al., 1996). Thus, when measures o f verbal, 
reasoning, and spatial ability are combined to obtain broad ability estimates, gender gaps 
are largely eliminated. However, as reported by Casey, Nuttall, Pezaris, and Benbow 
(1995), males are particularly advantaged in mathematical-ability tasks. This difference is 
principally seen at the upper end o f the ability continuum. In contrast, no gender
86
differences in mathematical ability are seen in low-ability and average-ability samples.
As noted by Brody (1992), the difference in mathematical ability may be due to highly 
developed visual-spatial skills in such high-ability males.
The experimental AIG measure tasks the examinee with quickly identifying 
mathematical manipulations and drawing relationships across a visual-spatial field. 
Therefore, one may expect to see differential scoring on such a measure. An independent- 
samples Mest was conducted to compare gender differences in scoring on the 
experimental AIG measure. Results of the analysis indicate a significant effect for 
gender, /(326.11) = 3.69, p  < .001, with men receiving higher scores than women. 
Likewise, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare score differences 
between the mTurk and snowball samples. Results o f the analysis indicate a significant 
sample effect, /(331) = -2.74, p  = .007, with the mTurk sample receiving higher scores 
than the snowball sample. For examinees who provided demographics, the scores 
produced by male and females at six age intervals for the total, mTurk, and snowball 
samples are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Likewise, the scores produced 
by males and females by educational attainment are presented in Table 5.
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Table 2. Experimental AIG Measure Score Means and Standard Deviations 
by Gender fo r  Six Age Intervals.______________________________________
Male Female Total Sample
Age intervals n M SD n M SD n M SD
18-29 63 11.0 5.6 52 8.1 3.9 115 9.7 5.1
30-39 75 10.3 5.2 37 8.0 5.1 112 9.6 5.2
40-49 24 9.0 4.5 22 7.3 3.7 46 8.2 4.2
50-59 15 8.9 5.3 15 9.5 4.4 30 9.2 4.8
60-69 7 5.9 6.4 4 10.3 7.9 11 7.5 6.9
70+ 6 7.7 8.0 4 3.5 1.3 10 6.0 6.4
Total 190 10.0 5.5 134 8.0 4.4 324 9.2 5.2
Table 3. Experimental AIG Measure Score Means and Standard Deviations 
by Gender for Six Age Intervals for the mTurk sample.___________________
Male  Female Total Sample
Age intervals n M SD n M SD n M  SD
18-29 59 11.0 5.8 40 8.3 4.0 99 9.9 5.3
30-39 65 10.3 5.2 28 8.3 5.2 93 9.7 5.2
40-49 22 9.1 4.7 21 7.2 3.8 43 8.2 4.3
50-59 15 8.9 5.3 11 9.9 4.8 26 9.3 5.0
60-69 2 14.0 5.7 2 13.0 9.9 4 13.5 6.6
70+ 2 16.5 .7 0 n/a n/a 2 16.5 .7
Total 165 10.4 5.3 102 8.3 4.5 267 9.6 5.1
Table 4. Experimental AIG Measure Score Means and Standard Deviations
by Gender fo r  Six Age Intervals fo r  the snowball sample.
Male Female Total Sample
Age intervals n M SD n M SD n M  SD
18-29 4 11.3 4.0 12 7.7 3.7 16 8.6 3.9
30-39 10 10.3 5.6 9 7.0 5.0 19 8.7 5.4
40-49 2 7.5 .7 1 8.0 n/a 3 7.7 .6
50-59 0 n/a n/a 4 8.5 3.8 4 8.5 3.8
60-69 5 2.6 2.6 2 7.5 7.8 7 4.0 4.5
70+ 4 3.3 5.3 4 3.5 1.3 8 3.4 3.5
Total 25 7.6 5.7 32 7.1 4.1 57 7.3 4.8
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Table 5. Experimental AIG Measure Score Means and Standard Deviations by
Gender fo r  Eight Educational Attainments.
Educational attainment
Male Female Total Sample
n M SD n M SD n M SD
High school grad 27 9.5 5.0 17 7.1 5.9 44 8.6 5.4
Some college 33 11.2 5.8 30 7.4 3.8 63 9.4 5.2
Trade/technical 5 8.4 4.7 8 5.6 3.0 13 6.7 3.8
Associate's degree 24 9.5 5.5 12 8.7 4.8 36 9.3 5.3
Bachelor's degree 74 9.5 5.6 49 8.4 3.9 123 9.1 5.0
Master's degree 18 10.4 4.2 19 9.9 4.6 37 10.2 4.3
Professional degree 4 12.8 5.1 1 4.0 n/a 5 11.0 5.9
Doctorate degree 6 11.3 6.8 3 4.0 4.4 9 8.9 6.9
Total 191 10.0 5.4 139 8.0 4.4 330 9.1 5.1
Some classical test theory results. Using the precedent set by Doebler and 
Holling (2015), classical test theory analyses commonly reported in scale development 
research are presented here to aid in the interpretation of the psychometric characteristics 
of the experimental AIG measure. These statistics are meant to provide the reader with a 
more complete understanding of how the measure is performing. In general, Cronbach 
alpha values o f .70 or greater indicate acceptable internal consistency (Kline, 1999). 
However, Kline also notes that cognitive ability measures should strive for alphas of .80 
or greater. The experimental AIG measure demonstrated adequate internal consistency (a 
= .86; SEM =  1.91). Likewise, Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) suggest that item 
discrimination values o f greater than .20 are sufficient while Anastasi and Urbina (1997) 
propose that item difficulty values between .15 and .85 are acceptable. Item 
discrimination values ranged from .34 to .52 (median = .43) while difficulty values
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ranged from .14 to .63 (median = .46) indicating that the item statistics largely conform to 
recommended tolerances.
Linear Logistic Test Model (LLTM). The evaluation of item radicals and 
incidentals can be accomplished either through the LLTM (De Boeck & Wilson, 2004; 
Fischer, 1973, 1995) or multiple regression analyses (Gorin & Embretson, 2006). In AIG 
studies, the LLTM is more commonly employed since it provides a means to evaluate 
cognitive models (Arendasy et al., 2008; Arendasy & Sommer, 2010, 2012; Arendasy et 
al., 2012; Freund et ah, 2008). That is, LLTM allows for the empirical testing o f the 
cognitive processes that contribute to item difficulty, thus demonstrating construct 
validity o f the items generated from the item model (Fischer, 1973). Under the LLTM, 
the difficulty parameter o f the Rasch model is reduced into a linear combination of 
radical effects, allowing for their contribution to the prediction o f item difficulty to be 
assessed (Freund et ah, 2008; Holling, Bertling, & Zeuch, 2009). That is, the LLTM 
assumes that the difficulty parameter of the Rasch model is comprised of several 
cognitive operations that sum to the overall difficulty parameter estimate (Baghaei & 
Kubinger, 2015). As such, there is no point in decomposing the difficulty parameter o f a 
Rasch model that lacks fit, as the data produced would lack meaning (Fischer, 2005). 
Therefore, assessing the fit of the Rasch model is prerequisite for applying the LLTM 
(Fischer, 1973; Poinstingl, 2009).
The consistency of the Rasch model can be assessed through likelihood ratio tests 
determining the fit of the data to the model. As noted by Rost (1982), the Rasch model 
assumes both item and person homogeneity. As such, both forms o f homogeneity must be 
tested. Tests o f item homogeneity determine if more than one person parameter is
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needed. Conversely, checking for person homogeneity entails determining if  more than 
one item parameter is needed for each item to describe the data.
The Martin-Lof (1973) test for unidimensionality is a likelihood ratio test used to 
examine the fit o f the Rasch model by separating the items of a measure into two groups 
o f items. The item parameters o f these groups of items are subsequently examined for 
homogeneity (Mair, Hatzinger, & Maier, 2013). If the maximum likelihood values of 
both sets of items are approximately equal to the maximum likelihood calculated for both 
sets of items together, then the Rasch model holds, and it is assumed that both sets of 
items tap the same dimensions (Verguts & De Boeck, 2000). Thus, non-significant values 
indicate that Rasch model holds. The Martin-Lof results failed to reveal a significant
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difference (median raw score: % [120] = 82.36, p  > .05).
The Andersen (1973) likelihood ratio test was also used to determine the fit of the 
data to the Rasch model. This test compares the item parameters of two predefined 
subgroups in the total sample to determine if differential item functioning is present as a 
result of the splitting criterion (Futschek, 2014). In AIG studies, median raw scores are 
commonly used as the partitioning criterion (Freund et al., 2008; Arendasy & Sommer, 
2012). If the likelihood ratio test fails to reach significance, then the fit o f the data to 
Rasch model is retained and the LLTM can be estimated (Baghaei & Kubinger, 2015). 
The results o f the Andersen test indicate that the data fit the Rasch model (median raw 
score: %2 [21] = 24.79,/? > .05). As such, Hypothesis 1 concerning the unidimensionality 
o f the AIG measure is supported.
Under the LLTM, item difficulty is calculated based on the weighted contribution 
o f the item radicals through a design matrix, indicating the degree to which these
91
elements are related to the cognitive complexity o f AIG items (Embretson & Daniel,
2008). As a result, the combined effects of radicals can be used to account for the 
difficulty parameter in the Rasch model, supporting the construct representation of the 
item model (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012). The hypothesized cognitive components that 
are required to solve assessment items are entered as a Q-matrix. The Q-matrix used in 
the current analysis is presented in Table 6. The columns o f the Q-matrix represent the 
cognitive operations measured by the experimental AIG measure, and the column values 
indicate the weights applied to each o f the cognitive process for each item. For instance, 
the number series pattern in Item 1 (e.g., 1 0 - 8 - 6 :  1 7 - 1 5 - 1 3 )  consisted of 
subtraction between the first and second number, and subtraction between the second and 
third number (Consistent Mathematical Operation). However, Item 2 (e.g., 10 -  8 -  12 : 
1 7 - 1 5 - 1 9 )  consisted o f subtraction between the first and second number and addition 
between the second and third numbers (Mixed Mathematical Operations). As such, the Q- 
matrix details the hypothetical cognitive components (i.e., radicals) that are thought to 
influence item difficulty.
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Table 6. Q-Matrix fo r  the Experimental AIG Measure
Item
Consistent
Mathematical
Operations
Mixed
Mathematical
Operations
Duplicate
Numbers
Flipped
Relationship
1 1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0
3 0 0 1 0
4 0 1 0 0
5 1 0 0 0
6 0 0 1 0
7 0 0 1 0
8 0 0 1 0
9 1 0 0 1
10 0 1 0 1
11 0 1 0 1
12 1 0 0 1
13 0 0 1 1
14 0 0 1 1
15 0 1 0 1
16 0 1 0 1
17 0 0 1 1
18 0 0 1 1
19 0 1 0 0
20 0 1 0 0
21 0 0 1 0
22 0 0 1 0
Radical difficulties are assessed through an easiness parameter (i.e., eta). The 
easiness parameters, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for each o f the four 
hypothesized radicals in the LLTM analysis are presented in Table 7. Negative easiness 
parameter values indicate cognitive operations that increase the difficulty o f items while 
positive values indicate radicals that can reduce the difficulty o f items (Baghaei & 
Kubinger, 2015). As such, the item radicals o f “Mixed Mathematical Operations” and 
“Flipped Relationships” increase the difficulty o f items, while “Consistent Mathematical
93
Operations” and “Duplicate Numbers” decrease the difficulty of items. As suggested by 
Baghaei and Kubinger (2015), if the confidence intervals that surround the easiness 
parameters fail to include zero, the radical specified significantly contributes to item 
difficulty. Radicals that fail to support the predicted relationship with item difficulty can 
be excluded from the item generation process and the cognitive model can be redefined. 
All radicals of the experimental AIG measure significantly predict item difficulty. As 
such, Hypotheses 2a through 2d regarding the ability o f the radicals to significantly 
predict item difficulty is supported.
Table 7. Parameter Estimates, Standard Error, and Confidence Intervals fo r  the Item 
Radicals o f  the Experimental AIG Measure____________________________________
Parameter Estimate SE Lower Cl Upper Cl
Consistent Mathematical Operations 0.500 0.171 0.166 0.834
Mixed Mathematical Operations -1.050 0.133 -1.310 -0.790
Duplicate Numbers 0.550 0.177 0.204 0.896
Flipped Relationships -0.703 0.058 -0.815 -0.590
Further demonstration o f the construct representation of the LLTM analysis is 
indicated by the correlation of the empirically generated Rasch easiness parameters to 
those predicted by the LLTM analysis. As indicated by Arendasy and Sommer (2013), R2 
values o f .70 and greater are desirable. The empirically derived and predicted item 
difficulty parameters o f the experimental AIG measure were highly correlated (r = .97). 
Thus, the R2 value in this analysis was .93, indicating that 93% of the variance in the 
Rasch difficulty parameter could be accounted for by the cognitive model. The plot o f the 
empirically derived and predicted item difficulty parameters is presented in Figure 3. As
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such, Hypothesis 2 regarding the construct representation of the radicals o f the 
experimental AIG measure is supported.
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Figure 3. Plot o f Empirically and LLTM Generated Item Difficulty Parameter Estimates
Discussion
The purpose o f the current study was to understand the construct representation of 
an experimental AIG measure by assessing the influence of the hypothesized cognitive 
components on item difficulty. Conventional item analysis suggests that although the 
items of the AIG measure were generated from a random base number and the 
presentation of radicals was randomized, the measure demonstrates adequate internal 
consistency (.86) for a measure o f mental abilities. Likewise, median item discrimination 
(.43) and difficulty (.46) values produced are within established guidelines. From a
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classical test construction perspective, the items o f the experimental AIG measure are 
well correlated, able to distinguish test taker performance, and of appropriate difficulty.
The results of Study 1 also show that it is possible to model the experimental AIG 
measure data through Rasch and LLTM, allowing for an estimation of the contribution of 
the influence that radicals impart on item difficulty. According to the Martin-Lof and 
Andersen tests, item and person homogeneity are present, supporting unidimensionality 
of the experimental AIG Measure and fit to the Rasch model.
Using LLTM, Mixed Mathematical Operations had the greatest impact on 
increasing the difficulty o f items followed by Flipped Relationships. Presumably, each of 
these radicals placed a cognitive load on working memory reducing the likelihood of 
obtaining a correct answer within the time allotted. In contrast, Consistent Mathematical 
Operations and the inclusion of a duplicate number within a term had the opposite effect, 
lowering the difficulty of the items generated. As such, this result provides evidence 
supporting the inclusion of the hypothesized item radicals in the item model since these 
elements affect item difficulty. Likewise, the hypothesized cognitive model accounted for 
a large portion (93%) of the variance in the Rasch difficulty parameter, producing results 
that are similar to other LLTM investigations (e.g., Arendasy, 2000, 2005; Arendasy & 
Sommer, 2005, 2007; Arendasy et al., 2007; Gittler, 1990; Gittler & Arendasy, 2003). As 
such, the cognitive model specified demonstrates substantial coverage of the processes 
test takers use to obtain a correct response to the items of the measure. Thus, the analyses 
detailed in Study 1 support the assertion that experimental AIG measure demonstrates 
adequate unidimensionality and construct representation.
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 2 
TEMPORAL STABILITY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Study 2 was designed to assess the temporal stability of the experimental AIG 
measure across test administrations. Although this type of analysis is not commonly 
performed on on-the-fly AIG measures, test-retest correlations are commonly used in 
classical test design to describe scale functioning. As such, this study is designed to 
provide insights into the stability o f experimental AIG measure scores over time. 
Participants
A subset of Study 1 examinees elected to participate in Study 2. The sample 
consisted o f 36 respondents (22 male and 14 female) from the United States between the 
ages of 21 and 71 (M =  37.69; SD  = 14.59). According to Field (2009), samples of this 
size (N>  30) are generally sufficient for research purposes. The majority o f the 
participants were recruited through mTurk (77.8%). The remaining 22.2% of participants 
were recruited via snowball sampling through social media. O f the sample, 66.7% 
identified as White/Caucasian, 11.1 % as African-American, 8.3% as Hispanic-American, 
5.6% as Asian-American, 2.8% as American-Indian, and 11.1% as other. Likewise, 
participant educational attainment levels were as follows: 16.7% high school diploma or 
equivalent (e.g., GED); 8.3% some college credit, no degree; 2.8%
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trade/technical/vocational training; 8.3% Associate degree; 50.0% Bachelor’s degree; 
11.1% Master’s degree; 2.8% Doctorate degree.
Procedure
Experimental AIG measure data were collected on two occasions. Participant data 
for the first administration was collected as part of Study 1. A subset o f the participants 
who completed Study 1 was invited to complete the measure for a second time. 
Approximately one week following the first administration, participants were provided 
with the link to the experimental AIG measure for a second time and asked to complete 
the scale. For each administration, total scores were calculated using the same scoring 
scheme described in Chapter 2. A total of 47 participants completed the experimental 
AIG measure twice. Due to suspected changes in the manner in which examinees 
approached the second administration, examinees who obtained score differences greater 
than 3 SEMs across administrations were removed from the test-retest sample. As a 
result, 11 people were removed from the sample to arrive at the total sample (N  = 36).
The mean number of days between administrations was 8.78 (SD = 2.38).
Results
The current analysis tests the temporal stability o f the experiential AIG measure 
by assessing the reliability o f the measure over two testing sessions. As noted by McCrae, 
Kurtz, Yamagata, and Terracciano (2011), test-retest reliability is conceptually 
independent o f internal consistency, reflecting the consistency o f scores obtained on 
separate occasions. Anastasi and Urbina (1997) state that test-retest reliability “shows the 
extent to which scores on a test can be generalized over different occasions; the higher 
the reliability, the less susceptible the scores are to random daily changes in the
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conditions of the examinee or the testing environment” (p. 92). In general, test-retest 
values of .70 or greater are considered acceptable (Andrews, Peter, & Teesson, 1994; 
Burlingame, Lambert, Reisinger, Neff, & Mosier, 1995). The administration means, 
standard deviations, and test-retest correlation are presented in Table 8. As shown, the 
correlation between two experimental AIG measure administrations is acceptable. 
Therefore, the results of this study support Hypothesis 3 and the temporal stability of the 
experimental AIG measure.
Table 8. Test-Retest Reliability fo r  the Experimental AIG Measure
First Testing Second Testing
Experimental AIG Measure M SD M SD r
Total Score 9.50 4.14 9.89 4.96 .80*
Note. N  = 36; *p < .001.
Discussion
Study 2 was designed to assess the relationship that the experimental AIG 
measure shares with itself across test administrations. The results o f this analysis indicate 
that the experimental AIG measure correlates well with itself (.80). Previous test-retest 
research using AIG measures has obtained similar results (Freund & Holling, 2011). 
However, to the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first test-retest study of an on-the-fly 
AIG measure. Rather, previous research used static items created using AIG 
methodology, mimicking traditional test-retest methods. As such, these measures are 
susceptible to the same practice effects seen in paper-and-pencil measures of cognitive 
ability. Given that each participant was administered assessments consisting of different 
items at an average interval of slightly over one week, the results obtained from the 
current analysis are promising. Although a higher test-retest value is desirable, the items
of the experimental AIG measure may contain item features (e.g., radicals and 
incidentals) that we have yet to identify or control. Likewise, modified scoring schemes 
allowing for partial credit may improve the temporal consistency o f the scores obtained 
from the measure. As such, supplemental research examining the manipulation o f the 
basic item model and score calculations may produce more robust test-retest figures.
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY 3 
SCALE VALIDATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Study 3 was designed to assess the relationship between the experimental AIG 
measure and other measures o f G f  To this end, the experimental AIG measure was 
correlated with two established measures of G f Likewise, the relationship between the 
AIG measure and age, which is known to be related to Gf, was examined. Thus, the aim 
of Study 3 is to assess Hypotheses 3 concerning the criterion validity o f the experimental 
AIG measure.
Participants
A subset of Study 1 examinees elected to participate in Study 3. The sample 
consisted o f 31 respondents (12 male and 19 female) from the United States between the 
ages of 19 and 81 (M=  43.76; SD = 17.58). According to the central limit theorem, 
samples o f greater than 30 participants will approximate a normal distribution (Field,
2009). As such, the size of the sample in the current study is adequate. All participants 
were recruited via snowball sampling through social media. O f the sample, 74.1% 
identified as White/Caucasian, 6.5% as Hispanic-American, and 19.4 % as other. 
Likewise, participant educational attainment levels were as follows: 9.7% some college
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credit, no degree; 3.2% trade/technical/vocational training; 38.7% Bachelor’s degree; 
32.2% Master’s degree; 16.1% Doctorate degree.
Procedure
Study data were collected using three measures (described below). Participant 
data on the experimental AIG measure were collected as part o f Study 1. A subset o f the 
participants who completed Study 1 was invited to complete the criterion validation 
measures. Following the completion of the experimental AIG measure, participants were 
provided with a unique identifying code and redirected to a survey containing the 
criterion validation measures hosted on Qualtrics.com. Before beginning the criterion 
validation measures, participants were instructed to enter a unique identifying code 
allowing the scores obtained from the experimental AIG measure and validation 
measures to be linked.
Measures
AIG Measure. The independent measure of G f  was assessed using the same 
experimental AIG measure used in Study 1. The researcher invited a subset o f the Study 
1 participants to participant in the current analysis after completing the 22 item 
experimental AIG measure. Total scores were based on the scoring procedure described 
in Chapter 2.
Letter Sets. Letter Sets (Set 1) (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976) 
measures an examinee’s ability to identify patterns in groups of letters and was used as a 
measure G f  Each item consists of five four-letter strings (e.g., NLIK, PLIK, QLIK, 
THIK, VLIK). The examinee’s task was to identify the rule shared by four o f the five 
strings and eliminate the string that does not conform to the rule. Seven minutes were
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provided to complete the 15-item measure. Scores range from 0-15 with higher scores 
indicating better performance. Previous research indicates that Letter Sets are relatively 
culture-free measures, independent of quantitative or verbal abilities, provide an efficient 
measure o f G f  and require only a minimal investment o f time (Duran, Powers, &
Swinton, 1987). Redick, Unsworth, Kelly, & Engle (2012) estimate the internal 
consistency o f Letter Sets to be .78. Likewise, when subjected to confirmatory factor 
analysis, the Letter Sets task loads substantially (.81) on the G f  factor, indicating 
appreciable fit to the construct (Hicks et al., 2015).
Number Series. Number Series (Thurstone & Thurstone, 1962) measures 
mathematical-inductive reasoning, and is thought to be primarily influenced by G f  (Kvist 
& Gustafsson, 2008). Each item of the measure consists o f a series of numbers (e.g., 10, 
11, 12, 13, 14). The examinee’s task is to identify the underlying mathematical 
relationship shared between terms and extrapolate the next number in the sequence. 
Examinees have 4.5 minutes to complete the 15-item measure. In a longitudinal study, 
Schaie (2005) reports that the Number Series task displays a test-retest reliability o f r = 
.77 and a seven-year test retest reliability r = .74. Likewise, Kvist and Gustafsson (2008) 
report that the Number Series task loads substantially (.81) on the G f  factor when 
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis, suggesting a strong fit to the construct.
Results
In this analysis, the correlational relationships between the experimental AIG 
measure and established measures o f G f  are presented. Since this analysis assesses the 
theoretical relationship between the experimental measure and criterion measures, it is 
necessary to correct for a lack o f reliability in the criterion (Letter Sets and Number
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Series), but not the independent measure (experimental AIG measure) (Ghiselli, 
Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981; Guilford, 1954; Guion & Highouse, 2006; Schmitt & 
Klimoski, 1991). Failure to correct for unreliability artificially weakens coefficient values 
and masks the true relationship (Salgado, Moscoso, & Anderson, 2016). The means, 
standard deviations, and corrected and uncorrected correlations for the experimental AIG 
and criterion measures are presented in Table 9. As suggested by Hopkins (2002), the 
following guidelines can be used to interpret the correlations: coefficients between .00 
and .09 are very small or trivial; coefficients between .10 and .29 are small; coefficients 
between .30 and .49 are moderate; coefficients between .50 and .69 are large; coefficients 
between .70 and .89 are very large; and coefficients between .90 and 1.00 are nearly 
perfect. Using Hopkins’s conventions, the correlations between the experimental AIG 
measure and the criterion measures in Table 9 are classified as “large.” As such, the 
results o f this analysis support Hypotheses 4a and 4b as indicated by a significant 
relationship between the experimental AIG measure and criterion measures o f Letters 
Sets and Number Series, respectively.
Table 9. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between the Experimental AIG  
Measure and Criterion Measures
Measure M SD 1 2 3
1. Experimental AIG Measure 7.58 4.48 —
2. Letter Sets 9.61 3.35 .50 (.44*) —
3. Number Series 7.71 2.87 .61 (.54**) .90 (.70***) -
Note. n = 31; Corrected correlation coefficients are outside o f parentheses;
Uncorrected correlation coefficients inside o f parentheses; *p < .05; ** p  < .01; ***p 
<.001
Previous research has also noted that G f  is related to demographic variables. For 
instance, Cattell (1943) suggests that G f  tends to decrease with age. Therefore, the scores 
of the experimental AIG measure should decrease as a function of examinee age. Using 
the participant data described in Study 1, the means, standard deviations, and corrected 
and uncorrected correlations for the experimental AIG measure and age are presented in 
Table 10. The result of this analysis supports Hypothesis 4c as indicated by a significant 
negative relationship between the experimental AIG measure and examinee age.
Table 10. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between the Experimental AIG  
Measure and Age____________________________________________________________
Measure M SD  1 2
1. Experimental AIG Measure 9.20 5.12
2. Age 36.30 12.67 -0.16** —
Note. N =  333. *p < .05; **p < 01; ***p < .001
Discussion
Study 3 was designed to assess the relationship that the experimental AIG 
measure shares with established measures o f Gf. After correcting for unreliability in the 
criterion measures, the scores obtained from the experimental AIG measure and Letter 
Sets (Ekstrom et al., 1976) produced a correlation of .50. Likewise, using the same 
correction, the scores of the experimental AIG measure and Number Series (Thurstone & 
Thurstone, 1962) produced a correlation o f .61. Using Hopkins’s (2002) evaluative 
guidelines, these correlations are described as “large.” As such, the results o f this study 
indicate that the experimental AIG measure is tapping the construct of G f  as measured by 
other established measures.
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The negative relationship between age and G f  has been noted for some time. As 
described by Cattell (1943), the nature o f G f is such that ability gains are seen through 
adolescence and then diminishes with age. Past research examining the longitudinal 
relationship between G f and perceptual speed support the generalized slowing of 
processing abilities as one ages (Schaie, 1989). Likewise, Bors and Forrin (1995) found 
that the relationship between age and G f was reduced to a nonsignificant value after 
controlling for mental speed, indicating that the decrement of G f  with age is substantially 
related to processing speed. These findings are buttressed by findings linking G f  and 
shorter reaction times (Grabner, Fink, Stipacek, Neuper, & Neubauer, 2004). The 
experimental AIG measure was designed as a brief measure o f G f  forcing examinees to 
respond quickly to items. As such, it is not surprising that in the current study, a 
significant negative relationship was found between the experimental AIG measure and 
age. This result provides limited support o f the assertion that the experimental measure is 
tapping aspects of G f
While the results obtained from the current study are promising, it should be 
noted that the measures used in this study consisted of relatively brief criterion measures 
o f G f  McGrew (2009) notes that G f  is associated with myriad of inductive and deductive 
tasks. As such, future studies should be conducted on a diverse array o f G/instruments to 
better understand the relationship that the experimental AIG measure has with G f 
However, taken together, the results of this study largely support the assertion that the 
experimental AIG measure conforms to the G f  construct, particularly as measured by 
established criterion measures.
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION
In the psychological sciences, perhaps no construct has received as much attention 
as cognitive ability. Although competing perspectives and theoretical orientations have 
emerged regarding the nature of intellectual functioning, there is overwhelming evidence 
that generalized intelligence plays a key role. Across situations g  demonstrates a 
predictable influence on academic success (Ones et al., 2006), workplace performance 
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), and problem solving in everyday situations (Gottfredson, 
2002). Due to the substantial relationship shared with g, G f is regarded as the backbone 
of intellect (Arendasy et al., 2008; Gustafsson, 1984, 1989,2001). Consisting of the 
ability to adapt to new situations and solve novel problems (Cattell, 1957,1971; 
Gustafsson, 1984,1989, 2001; Schneider & McGrew, 2012), G f  is best measured by non­
verbal and culture-free tasks such as number series and analogical reasoning problems 
(Sattler, 2001).
Despite a long psychometric tradition associated with the measurement of 
cognitive abilities, researchers have embraced technological advancements as a means to 
uncover what it means to be smart. For instance, computer technology has provided test 
developers with a dynamic platform to present an immense array o f unique test items
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types. Computers can display graphical figures and images o f greater complexity than 
could be conveyed through paper-and-pencil administration. Coupled with internet 
technology, assessments can be delivered to all comers of the globe in a cost effective 
and convenient manner. However, such unproctored administrations raise the issue o f test 
security, such as cheating and item sharing (Cook & Eignor, 1991), limiting the 
acceptance o f the results produced (Naglieri et al., 2004).
Historically, test developers have used multiple test forms or CAT administrations 
to combat test security issues. While these methods are able to curtail some of the threats 
to test security as compared to fixed measures (Guo, Tay, & Drasgow, 2009), these 
methods also require large pools o f continuously updated, psychometrically sound items. 
However, it has become clear that costly and inefficient methods o f traditional item 
construction by human item writers cannot keep pace with the growing demand.
Likewise, the items created by such means often lack the psychometric rigor needed to 
seed item pools. As such, researchers have begun to explore advanced methods to 
generate high-quality test items.
Rooted in cognitive and computer sciences, AIG methodology allows researchers 
to specify the structural elements that define item difficulty to produce large pools of 
items with known psychometric characteristics (Geerlings et al., 2011). The rapidly 
advancing field o f AIG methodology has gained a considerable amount of attention from 
the psychometrics community for its ability to quickly, efficiently, and cost effectively 
produce vast pools o f items based solely on an item model and a computer algorithm 
(Gierl et al., 2015). In doing so, the AIG framework solves many of the practical issues 
and threats to test security that have hindered test construction and administration.
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In the present study, a unique item type designed to measure G f  was developed 
using AIG methodology, allowing for items to be generated on-the-fly at the moment of 
item presentation. The item type was specifically designed such that the structural 
elements o f the item model could be manipulated by a computer algorithm to guide item 
construction. Using the automatic min-max approach (Arendasy & Sommer, 2010,2012) 
as a guiding force, the latent trait, item format, cognitive model, and radicals and formal 
constraints were specified and deduced by the researcher. Thus, the current research 
builds upon previous research by creating a unique measure o f G f that combines two 
highly ^-saturated measures: number series and analogical reasoning tasks. The benefit of 
using such methodology is that construct relatedness o f the measure is built directly into 
the items generated through the systematic manipulation o f the item characteristics 
thought to relate to item difficulty. Likewise, the elements that could potentially interfere 
with the cognitive processes involved with solving the items were constrained or omitted. 
Consequently, the approach taken in the current study allows for the generation of 
potentially thousands o f unique items generated on-the-fly at the moment o f presentation, 
without the need for human review before their administration. The result of this process 
was a brief 22-item experimental AIG measure o f G f  combining two highly g-saturated 
tasks.
The current research was designed to investigate the efficacy o f the experimental 
AIG measure in a sample o f adults residing in the United States. In a series o f studies, the 
construct representation, temporal stability, and criterion-relatedness of the experimental 
AIG measure were examined.
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Study 1
In Study 1, along with conventional psychometric analyses, the unidimensionality 
and construct representation of the experimental AIG measure were assessed. 
Conventional psychometric statistics indicate that the experimental AIG measure is 
internally consistent with acceptable discrimination and difficulty values. Likewise, the 
results of the Martin-Lof and Andersen likelihood ratio tests indicate that the 
experimental measure data conform well to the Rasch model, supporting its 
unidimensionality. Using an LLTM analysis (Fischer, 1973; Van den Noortgate, de 
Boeck, & Meulders, 2003) to test the efficacy of four hypothesized radicals (Consistent 
Mathematical Operations, Mixed Mathematical Operations, Duplicate Numbers, Flipped 
Relationships), the results indicated that each significantly contributed to scale difficulty. 
Therefore, the results of this analysis can be seen as a validation o f the use o f the 
hypothesized radicals, thus supporting the construct representation o f the experimental 
AIG measure (Embretson, 1983). Likewise, the results of the LLTM analysis support the 
inclusion of the radicals not only in the current cognitive model, but also in the 
generation of future AIG items as they are now calibrated. Furthermore, the hypothesized 
cognitive model accounted for a substantial portion o f the empirically derived difficulty 
parameter produced by the Rasch model. As such, the proposed model displays adequate 
content coverage as accounted for by the item radicals. Flowever, an examination o f the 
plot of empirically and LLTM derived difficulty parameters does indicate that the 
experimental AIG measure tests a limited range o f theta with items confined to the range 
of +2 to -2. As such, the inclusion o f a more diverse set o f item radicals into the 
construction o f the items may tap a wider breadth of intellectual functioning. While the
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elements that may improve the content coverage o f G f  using the present item type are 
addressed in the Limitations and Future Directions section, the results obtained in Study 1 
provide initial evidence for the construct representation of the items generated by the 
experimental AIG measure.
Study 2
In Study 2 the temporal stability o f the experimental AIG measure was assessed 
by administering the measure on two different occasions approximately one week apart. 
The results of this analysis indicate that the scores produced by the experimental AIG 
measure are consistent across testing situations. Specifically, the experimental AIG 
measure that was administered to participants on two different occasions consisted o f a 
diverse set o f items that had varying surface features and resulted in scores that were 
consistent.
Study 3
In Study 3, the criterion relationships shared between the experimental AIG 
measure and other established measures o f G f  were examined. The results o f the study 
indicate that large correlations coefficients were observed between the experimental 
measure and criterion measures. Likewise, using the total sample o f participants, a 
negative relationship was seen between the experimental AIG measure and age, a 
phenomenon that has been noted in other investigations o f the nature o f G f  (Cattell,
1943). Taken together, the scores obtained from the experimental AIG measure conform 
to the scores obtained from other criterion measures of G f  indicating that the scale is 
tapping aspects o f the construct of interest.
I l l
Limitations and Future Directions
As in all empirical studies, certain inherent limitations are evident that should be 
addressed, but also pave the way for future research. Given the many choices that were 
made in the creation o f the experimental AIG measures using an innovative item type, 
several aspects o f item development can be clarified through additional studies to 
improve the measurement precision o f the instrument. For instance, in the current 
experimental AIG measure, constraints were placed on the size of the randomly 
generated number used to seed the base number in each term, disallowing numbers to 
obtain values below zero. Likewise, the same constraint disallowed the numbers that 
comprised the terms to obtain values greater than 30. Similarly, constraints were placed 
on the change number that was used to advance each number o f the sequence to values of 
1 to 4. Future research could relinquish such constraints and then compare the restricted 
and unrestricted models. As such, additional research is required to assess the need for 
and effectiveness of limiting seed and change values to such a limited range.
Likewise, while the LLTM analysis described in Study 1 demonstrated that the 
proposed cognitive model showed substantial content coverage, a more diverse array of 
potential radical elements is possible. For instance, the current version o f the 
experimental AIG measure limited the size o f each analogical reasoning term to three 
numbers (e.g., 3 - 5 - 7 ) .  While this choice was made in the development phase to limit 
the cognitive complexity o f the items generated, as noted by Primi (2001), increasing the 
number of elements to which examinees must attend in G f tasks is expected to influence 
item complexity. Therefore, future research on the experimental AIG measure may 
choose to include number series terms with length as few as two numbers, or increase
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series length to include four or more numbers. Such changes to the scale may result in a 
more diverse array o f psychometric item attributes, exhibiting a greater range of 
difficulties.
Additionally, the number o f answer choices in the current version o f the 
experimental AIG measure was limited to three. Similar to the length of the number 
series in each term, varying the number o f answer choice from which the participant must 
choose could lower or raise the cognitive complexity of the items generated as the 
number o f elements from which the examinee must attend changes. Taken together, these 
two modifications to the experimental AIG measure could serve as radicals in future 
research, allowing for the production o f an extensive array o f items exhibiting diverse 
psychometric properties while still conforming to the G f  construct.
The experimental AIG measure also employed a relatively simplistic dichotomous 
scoring protocol in order to utilize the LLTM analysis. However, future iterations of the 
experimental AIG measure, or similar measures, could utilize a partial-credit scoring 
model, allowing for a more diverse range of scores. That is, a more complex scoring 
algorithm may be applied to the data, allowing item scores to take on a range of values 
depending on how quickly a correct answer is obtained. As such, participants could be 
awarded partial credit for answers, better allowing their score to reflect both their speed 
and accuracy. Hypothetically, a modified scoring scheme such as this may improve the 
internal consistency, temporal stability, and criterion relatedness o f the experimental AIG 
measure. Simply stated, a modified scoring algorithm may improve the measurement 
precision of G f
Importantly, although previous research has shown the value of the data collected 
from mTurk samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Casler et ah, 2013), and such crowd­
sourcing methods provide psychological researchers an expedient means to obtain 
variance on a range of psychological attributes (Chandler et ah, 2014; Krupnikov & 
Levine, 2014), their use should be further scrutinized. Logically, the compensation of 
participants from such sources is tied to how quickly they are able to complete as many 
of the competing tasks (e.g. the current experimental AIG measure) as are available at the 
time. Moreover, given the rising costs associated with acquiring participants from such 
sources (e.g., Bensinger, 2015), the data obtained from these participant pools deserves 
additional critical analysis as well as potential screening methods to identify high-quality 
workers.
Likewise, in addition to both video and written instructions detailing the tasks 
involved in answering the experimental AIG measure, participants were provided an 
opportunity to practice an unlimited number o f items before beginning the actual 
measure. In addition to becoming familiar with the tasks involved in answering a given 
item type, practice may allow for a more accurate assessment o f an individual’s true 
performance on a given task. As such, given that research has consistently found racial 
gaps in the scores obtained on cognitive measures (e.g., Roth et al., 2001), limiting their 
use in organizational settings, the availability o f practice items may serve to lessen such 
gaps. Likewise, such practice items may also serve to reduce examinee apprehension 
regarding the testing situation and bolster perceptions o f fairness. Future research may 
gauge the impact o f practice on G f  scores and examinee perceptions, potentially allowing 
for broader use in selection contexts.
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However, given the results, and pending replication, it is possible that an on-the- 
fly CAT measure can be developed based on the calibrated item radicals o f the 
experimental AIG measure. Using combinations o f item radicals, the length o f the 
experimental measure may be greatly reduced, providing a more expedient estimation of 
Gf. Thus, the creation o f such an adaptive measure would serve to reduce examinee 
fatigue while addressing some o f the test security threats associated with assessments 
derived from conventional methods. Likewise, AIG methodology as seen in the current 
on-the-fly measure also provides stable and effective alternate test forms for use in 
repeated measures studies and evaluations. As such, researchers and practitioners alike 
may use these types o f scales to evaluate the impact o f a variety o f psychological 
interventions. In addition to the test construction and test security issues associated with 
traditional item construction, researchers may also use these types o f measures to assess 
performance without concerns of item memorization.
Conclusion
The field o f cognitive abilities research can be seen as an evolving science. From 
the early days o f Galtonian measures to the advances brought by computerized 
technology, the field o f psychometrics has embraced methodological and technical 
advances. The advent o f AIG methodology serves as the next step in attempting to 
provide a more complete coverage o f the construct space. The current collection of 
studies introduces an experimental AIG measure as a means to overcome the limitations 
associated with conventional item creation methods and threats to test security. In sum, 
the results of these studies highlight the benefits o f using AIG methodology to quickly, 
economically, and effectively generate high-quality on-the-fly G f  test items. The
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experimental AIG measure fulfills the goal of delivering a measure o f cognitive ability 
that is well suited for large-scale cognitive ability assessment via online administration. 
Thus, as additional research is conducted in the development and calibration o f such 
instruments, researchers and organizations alike may realize the benefit o f using AIG 
methodology to produce effective measures.
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